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ABSTRACT
This study consists of three separate, yet interrelated analyses - all three examine the
effects of Latino immigration. Since the mid-1980s, the pattern of settlement by Latino migrants
has changed dramatically. These migrants are now settling in parts of the United States that have
never before had significant Latino populations. This has led many to fear an increase in crime.
Unfortunately, early explanations of immigration and crime focused on the experience of Eastern
European immigrants. Therefore, it has not been clear whether the experience of Latino
immigrants could be explained in the same way – especially with some researchers finding that
immigrants now lower crime rates. However, most recent research on immigration has failed to
analyze any of the new areas of settlement.
The first study examines immigration‟s effect on Latino homicide victimization by
grouping migrants according to their period of entry into the United States. Results show that
immigration has no effect in traditional areas, while only recent immigrant arrivals have an effect
in new destinations. Preliminary results from an additional analysis suggest this could be due to
changing emigration patterns in Mexico. Since 1990, more Mexican migrants have been coming
from states with high levels of violence.
The second study attempts to explain the effects of immigration on Latino homicide with
various measures of segregation. Given the beneficial nature of ethnic enclaves, it is assumed
that contact between Latinos will lower homicide victimization. Results support this hypothesis,
showing that Latino-Latino contact has a greater effect on homicide than Latino-White contact.
However, the effect of recent immigrants in new destinations cannot be explained away by any
of the segregation measures. As noted in the first analysis, a possible explanation is the changing
emigration patterns of Mexico.
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The third and final analysis examines how Latino immigration affects black homicide
rates through competition for low-skill employment. Results show that when Latinos gain
ground in low-skill employment relative to blacks, black homicide victimization increases.
However, the findings apply only to metropolitan and new destination areas. Further analysis
reveals that among the low-skill industries, the strongest effects are for
Manufacturing/Construction and Services.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The following study combines three separate, but interrelated analyses. The main
question addressed by the three papers is how changes in immigration policy, and the U.S.
Latino population, have affected homicide victimization rates. Throughout the three papers, two
concepts play a central role in shaping the questions that are asked: (1) new versus traditional
destinations and (2) the Latino paradox.
The main contribution of this study to the criminological literature is that it controls for
and recognizes that there are two types of Latino communities. Previous research on Latinos has
merely examined Latino communities in general, but when we construe Latino communities too
broadly, and view them as one big, Spanish-speaking throng, we get mired in paradoxes and
contradictions. This has led to the belief that there is a “Latino Paradox” (described below) –
that Latinos are somehow immune from the causes of crime.
But if we liberate ourselves from the notion of a single Latino community in America, the
puzzles evaporate and what remains is a rich and vibrant interpretation of Latino immigration
and crime. Essentially, Latino immigrants split into two groups. Prior to 1990, Latino migrants
followed well-worn paths to old and established immigrant communities. These host
communities offered a culturally familiar setting, a common language, job opportunities, and a
chance to interact with established Latinos who could help the newcomers accommodate to their
new environment. But after 1990, a robust economy and restrictive government policies
prompted a new wave of Latino migrants to settle in new and unfamiliar destinations,
disconnected from the local community and unprotected by an umbrella of social control. With
no insulation from a surrounding community, the voltage of their economic deprivation became
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fully apparent. In some of these new places, Latinos were murdered at an alarming rate, similar
to that of blacks.
For this reason, the present study recognizes that there are two distinct Latino communities –
traditional destinations and new destinations. The differences between the two areas are one of the
primary foci of this study. Many of the findings presented here suggest that, in general, new
destinations are dangerous places for Latinos, while traditional destinations are safe havens.
Although these new destinations may little resemble the robust and organized immigrant
communities in traditional areas, I caution against taking this contrast too far. It is wrong to assume
that traditional areas are always safe, bustling and well-organized Latino enclaves and new
destinations are uniformly bleak, dusty outposts of violence and lawlessness. Not so; the contrast
presented here of traditional and new destinations is merely a typology, a tool to better understand
the various shades of grey in real life. Therefore, the findings presented here should be taken with a
grain of salt.
The second important concept in this study, mentioned above, is the idea of a Latino Paradox.
Briefly, this refers to the fact that Latinos‟ levels of mortality - homicide included - are not as high

as their levels of socioeconomic disadvantage would predict. In other words, traditional
predictors of mortality, things like poverty, unemployment, and a lack of education, do not
accurately predict Latino mortality rates – as they had previously done for whites and blacks.
This is particularly puzzling to criminologists since Latinos and blacks, two minorities, have the
same level of disadvantage, but very different rates of violence. In other words, despite being
like blacks in almost every way, Latinos‟ rates of violence are closer to those of whites. Recent
research, however, provides some insight into this conundrum.
Bean et al (2009) suggest that yesterday‟s color line – white/non-white – has been
transformed into a black/non-black line, with most Latinos and Asians falling on the white side
2

of the line. The reason this shift is so important is discrimination. As Bean et al (2009) asks, if
Latinos, and Latino immigrants, are better off than blacks, “what does the experience of the new
immigrants, particularly the experience of contemporary Mexican immigrants who are especially
disadvantaged in terms of education and who often enter the country with the additional
handicap of unauthorized status, suggest about the degree of discrimination they face compared
to blacks?” Given this shift in the color line, perhaps the Latino paradox is not as paradoxical as
researchers previously thought.
Furthermore, if there is in fact a paradox, it might only apply when Latino communities
are viewed as being homogenous. As described above, this is not the case – at minimum, Latino
communities can be divided into “new” and “traditional” categories. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the Latino Paradox applies to both traditional and new Latino communities.
Hopefully, this study provides a first step to examining this question.
With these two concepts in mind, the following study is broken down as follows: Chapter
Two examines whether the effect of Latino immigration is invariant across destination types.
Chapter Three tests whether segregation plays a more important role than immigration in
predicting Latino homicide in both destination types. Chapter Four analyzes the effects of
immigration on black homicide rates through competition for low skill employment in new and
traditional destinations. Finally, Chapter Five provides an overview of the findings from all three
papers.
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CHAPTER 2: IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION, AND CHANGE IN U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY – THE EFFECT OF RECENT IMMIGRANTS ON
HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION

2.1: Introduction
During the latter part of the 20th Century, the United States saw a significant shift in its
demographic makeup. The majority of the change was due to the massive influx of Latinos into
the country. Though the history of Latino immigration to the United States can be traced back to
the early 1900s, the most dramatic changes have occurred in the last two decades of the century,
Prior to the mid-1980s, Latino immigration to the United States was driven by dramatic
changes in labor demand brought on by two World Wars and the United States government‟s
numerous attempts to control the number and race/ethnicity of the immigrants entering the
country. But as Massey and Capoferro (2009) point out, the most significant changes in Latino
immigration have occurred over the past 20-30 years. These changes can be almost entirely
attributed three major developments. The effects of the first two, the militarization of the U.S.Mexico border and the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), have been
twofold. First, both measures have dramatically increased the Latino population in the United
States through mass legalizations and by increasing the difficulty of entering and exiting the
United States, respectively. Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has
more than tripled from 14.5 million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008).
Second, militarizing the border and IRCA encouraged immigrants to settle in new places
by shutting down traditional entry points and by providing newly legal immigrants with greater
geographic mobility, respectively. The third major development, the passage of Proposition 187,
has also encouraged immigrants to settle in new places by effectively telling new migrants that
they were no longer welcome in California. As a direct result of these developments, the
4

majority of Latino immigrants are settling outside of California and Texas for the first time in
U.S. history.
The massive influx of Latinos into the United States has led many to fear an increase in
crime. Determining what structural variables help explain Latino homicide offending and
victimization is one of the neglected challenges facing criminologists today – especially
considering how little we know about Latino crime compared to whites and blacks (Phillips
2002). Although research on Latino homicide has only recently been given attention in the
criminological literature, what little research that has been done has shown not only that
predictors of black and white crime do not necessarily predict Latino crime (Martinez 1996; Lee
et al 2001; Dugan and Apel 2003; Nielsen, Lee, and Martinez 2005; Nielsen, Martinez, and Lee
2005), but also the differences between whites and blacks are not due to the same factors as the
differences between whites and Latinos (Phillips 2002; McNulty and Bellair 2003). Part of the
problem may be the unique role that immigration has played in the history of U.S. Latinos, as
outlined above.
The influx of immigrants and the rise of urbanization in the early part of the 20th century
helped lead to the core ideas in Social Disorganization Theory. First, immigration and
urbanization were viewed as having a negative overall impact on communities (Park and Burgess
1925; Wirth 1938), and was latter linked specifically to crime (Shaw and McKay 1942). Two
schools of social disorganization developed early on. The first included researchers like Louis
Wirth (1938), who believed that neighborhoods were being negatively impacted by (a)
increasing population, (b) ethnic heterogeneity, and (c) settlement density. The other school,
starting with the work of Park and Burgess (1925), did not believe “urbanism” was harming
neighborhoods; rather residential instability was the culprit. Later researchers, such as Shaw
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and McKay (1942), would take ideas from both schools and apply Social Disorganization Theory
to the study of crime.
But attempts to link Latino immigration and crime have suffered from several major
drawbacks. First, researchers tend to group all immigrants together, rather than look at Latino or
other immigrant groups separately. Similarly, most immigration-crime research has examined
immigration‟s effects on overall crime rates, rather than racially/ethnically disaggregated rates.
Given that 86% of homicides are intra-racial (Uniform Crime Reports 2009), this is especially
important. Second, as Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c: 337) point out, most previous research on
Latino immigration has focused on “old, safe, and relatively well-organized places.” While this
might be useful in determining the effects of ethnic communities on the immigration-crime link,
it does not provide much insight into what happens when Latinos venture outside of these
traditional destinations. Finally, given the new settlement patterns of Latino immigrants, it is
important for researchers to recognize that segregation may play an important role is how these
migrants fare in their new communities.
Therefore, this paper attempts to overcome these shortcomings by: (1) racially
disaggregating all immigration measures, (2) racially disaggregating homicide victimization, (3)
examining places in new and traditional destinations, and (4) examining metropolitan and rural
areas.
2.2: Latino Immigration in the 20th Century
The history of Latino immigration to the United States in the 20th century, while brief
compared to that of European immigration, has been rich and eventful. Although Latino
immigrants, and immigrants in general, come from many different countries (see Charts 2.1 and
2.2), most U.S. immigration policies have targeted Mexican migration and the U.S.-Mexico

6

border (Durand et al 2000; Massey and Capoferro 2009). Mexican migration to the United States
has had one constant: labor demand.
A series of immigration acts at the beginning of the 20th century worked to limit
immigration from countries that were traditional sources of labor. Two pre-World War I
measures, the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the Gentlemen‟s Agreement with Japan, effectively
cutoff employers from their primary source of agricultural and railroad workers (GuerinGonzales 1994). Following World War I, Congress passed the Immigration Acts of 1921 and
1924, enacting a quota system to regulate the number of immigrants allowed from each country.
Because of the difficulty in regulating overland borders, and the ease of regulating seaports, the
quotas were a de facto restriction of all immigrant groups, except those from Mexico (Ngai
1999). These immigration measures forced many business owners to turn to Mexican workers to
meet their labor demands. Although Mexican migration to the United States during the 1910s
and 1920s was less than half of what it would be over the next several decades, it marked the
first major influx, and recruitment, of Mexican workers into the United States.
The next major period in Mexican migration began in the 1940s with the United States‟
involvement in World War II. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States began
mobilizing for war, dramatically increasing the demand for labor in all sectors. In order to meet
this new demand for workers, United States employers once again turned to Mexican workers.
Enacted in 1942, the Bracero Accords brought Mexican farm workers to the United States under
supervision of the U.S. government (Craig 1971) by promising “minimum wages, adequate
living conditions, and the right to end their participation in the program and return to Mexico”

7

Chart 2.1: U.S. Immigrant Population by Region of Origin, 2000
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(Garcia 2002:31). The program was so successful that it lasted until 1964, despite being enacted
as a wartime measure (Calavita 1992), and provided work for an estimated 4.8 million Mexican
workers (Cerrutti and Massey 2006).
The end of the Bracero Accords in 1964 may have brought an end to government
sponsored Mexican immigration, but it did not stop migration altogether. After two decades of
using Mexican workers to fill their labor needs, many U.S. business owners continued recruiting
Mexican workers despite their lack of legal documents. Demand for unskilled labor continued
into the 1970s and 1980s, leading to an increase in undocumented migration that has continued
to the present.
Prior to the 1980s, Mexican migration followed two distinct patterns. First, nearly 80% of
all Mexican migrants settled in just two states: California and Texas (Durand et al 2000). This, in
essence, made immigration a regional rather than a national phenomenon for the United States.
Second, Latino immigration was typically a circular process. Migrants came to the United States
temporarily in order to earn enough wages to fund a project back home, such as a car, a house, or
a business (Durand and Massey 2006). This circular process was disrupted during the early
1990s by a new border enforcement policy that became known as “prevention through
deterrence” (Massey and Capoferro 2009). In 1993, Operation Blockade was launched in El
Paso, Texas and Operation Gatekeeper the following year in San Diego, California. Both
Operations sought to prevent border crossings through militarization and fence building. As a
result, border crossings at El Paso and San Diego were virtually eliminated (Nevins 2002),
making entry into the United States and Mexico more difficult.
With the militarization of the border making trips to and from Mexico riskier, more
migrants began to settle permanently in the United States rather than risk not being able to return
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at some future date. This, coupled with the three million immigrants naturalized with the
passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, has led to a dramatic increase in the
U.S. Latino population. Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has
more than tripled from 14.5 million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008),
surpassing blacks as the nation‟s largest minority.
A second major change in Latino immigration in the past two and a half decades has been
its geographic diversification. As stated above, prior to Operations Blockade and Gatekeeper,
42% of all Latino immigrants, and 77% of Mexican immigrants, settled in California and Texas.
That number had dropped to 32% and 48%, respectively, by 2005, meaning that Latinos, and
Mexicans in particular, have begun to settle outside of their traditional destinations.
Massey and Capoferro (2009) outline several reasons for this diversification. First, there
are the effects of the aforementioned Operation Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper. By taking
away the most popular entry points in Texas and California, immigrants were forced to cross at
other, less visible, and less used points along the U.S.-Mexico border. New entry points meant
new destinations.
Second, the mass legalizations as a result of the Immigration and Reform Control Act
(IRCA)1 flooded local labor markets - especially in California, which accounted for 54% of all
legalizations. As a result, undocumented migrants, who were previously limited in their
employment opportunities, were now free to find employment wherever they liked. This
effectively flooded California‟s labor market, making it a less attractive destination for newly
arrived immigrants. Furthermore, the acquisition of legal documents gave immigrants greater
geographic mobility, many of whom decided to move elsewhere to find employment.
1

IRCA addressed immigration in three major ways: (1) legalize all illegal immigrants residing the United States, (2)
penalize employers for hiring workers without proof of citizenship, and (3) increase federal funding for guarding the
border.
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Third, the passage of Proposition 187 in California also contributed to Latinos‟
geographic diversification. In the early 1990s, California suffered from severe economic
recession. Many residents, including Governor Pete Wilson, blamed many of the state‟s
problems on immigrants. This culminated in the passage of Proposition 187, which did the
following: (1) stop undocumented migrants from using social services, (2) required state and
local authorities to report suspected illegal aliens, and (3) made the sale or use of false
citizenship documents a felony offense (Calavita 1996). While most of its provisions were
declared unconstitutional in subsequent court battles, it sent a clear and strong message to
potential migrants that they were no longer welcome.
Finally, while California‟s economy sputtered, other state economies across the country
grew robustly. This lured young, male, foreign-born Latino migrants away from traditional
destinations in search of better opportunities elsewhere (Durand et al 2000; Lichter and Johnson
2006).
These are just a few possible explanations for the geographic dispersal of Latinos;
undoubtedly the cause is a mix of these and other factors. The fact remains, however, that
Latinos are now more spread out across the United States than ever before. Settling in new and
unfamiliar places poses many new problems for Latinos, several of which will be examined in
this paper.
2.3: Latino Immigration and Crime
As Latino immigrants continue to spread across the United States, scholars have once
again begun to analyze the link between immigration and crime. The idea that immigration and
crime are positively linked has a long history in sociological research. At the beginning of the
20th century, many Eastern European immigrants (Rubin 1941) and southern blacks (Grossman
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1991) migrated to central and northeast regions of the United States. Since many of these
migrants often settled in less desirable, crime ridden neighborhoods, many people began to
worry there might be an “immigrant problem” (Leuchtenberg 1958). Early explanations were
steeped heavily in Social Darwinism – suggesting that immigrants were culturally and
biologically inferior to natives (Coser 1977).
By the 1930s, several researchers began to develop socially and ecologically driven
theories to explain the social pathologies besetting immigrants. Shaw and McKay (1942), in a
landmark study, began mapping juvenile delinquency in Chicago neighborhoods. They noticed
that high rates of delinquency seemed to plague only a small number of neighborhoods.
Furthermore, they found that this small group of neighborhoods was experiencing persistently
high crime rates, despite a rapidly changing population. In these neighborhoods, crime
perpetuated from one generation to the next and one group of immigrants to the next. Shaw and
McKay felt that the only constant, the neighborhoods themselves, must be the key to explaining
the high rates of delinquency.
Concentric Zone Theory, developed by Park and Burgess (1925), supported the findings
of Shaw and McKay. It posits that when a city is fully developed, it will take on the form of five
concentric rings with social and physical conditions declining as one gets closer to the city
center. Park and Burgess argued that the ring nearest the city center (Transitional Zone) would be
the least desirable – deteriorating houses, abandoned buildings, and factories would be abundant.
Because the area was so undesirable, housing was cheap – allowing immigrants to settle in large
numbers.
Shaw and McKay‟s maps of Chicago showed that immigrants, and juvenile delinquency,
were, in fact, concentrated in the Transitional Zone. Furthermore, they found that these
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neighborhoods had a very high rate of population turnover – which Shaw and McKay found to
be one of the keys to explaining the high rates of crime. Their theory, which would become
known as Social Disorganization Theory, viewed communities as a dense network of formal and
informal ties that linked people and organizations together. These ties help the community reach
common goals – like fighting crime and following a path of conformity (Kasarda and Janowitz
1974). But, large changes over a short period of time – like immigrants pouring into a
community – disrupt the neighborhood‟s ability to regulate itself (Kornhauser 1978; Bankston
1998). This was illustrated by Thomas and Znaniecki‟s (1958) seminal study of Polish
immigrants in America.
Immigration, therefore, is thought to socially disorganize a community by disrupting social
ties through ethnic heterogeneity and population turnover2. But it appears that the link between
modern immigration, particularly Latino immigration, and crime may not follow the same
pattern. Among immigrants as a whole, there is mixed evidence that they contribute to crime.
Some studies report a positive association between immigration and crime (O‟Kane 1992;
Tanton and Lutton 1993; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson 2006) while some do not (Butcher and
Piehl 1998; Martinez 2000; Lee et al 2001; Reid et al 2005). In contrast, the assumption that
Latino immigration disorganizes communities and raises crime seems widely disconfirmed
(Martinez and Lee 1998; Martinez et al 2003; Stowell and Martinez 2007; Stowell and Martinez
2009; Desmond and Kubrin 2009). In fact, research by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) suggests
that Latinos‟ geographic mobility actually works to lower Latino homicide victimization rates.
Some researchers have gone so far as to suggest that Latino immigration was one of the
main forces behind the significant crime decline in the United States during the late 1990s.
2

Although this paper focuses exclusively on Social Disorganization as the theoretical framework for explaining the
immigration-crime relationship, there are a number of other explanations. See Ousey and Kurbin (2009) for a review
of other theoretical approaches.
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Sampson (2006; 2008) points out that the crime decline occurred at precisely the same time that
millions of Latino immigrants were pouring into the United States. Furthermore, as immigration
began to level off, so too did crime. This further fueled debate over whether there was a “Latino
Paradox”; that Latinos‟ level of mortality - homicide included - was not as high as their levels of
socioeconomic disadvantage would predict (Abraido-Lanza et al 1999; Smith and Bradshaw
2006; Turra and Elo 2008).
One explanation for this paradox points to the benefits provided by ethnic communities,
which Portes and Jensen (1992) describe as “a network of small enterprises that offer
employment comparable to those of the mainstream economy…[and] this network creates new
entrepreneurial opportunities for newcomers – opportunities that are absent elsewhere (p.420).
These communities make assimilation easier, not only on a cultural level, but also in the job
market – particularly for Latinos who have not yet mastered the English language. In a series of
papers that examines Latino homicide and migration patterns, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b;
2010c) show how moving into established Latino communities can help reduce exposure to
violence.
First, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) found that when Latinos move into a part of a city
that already had a relatively large Latino population, Latino homicide victimization and
economic deprivation decreases. The authors suggest that moving into neighborhoods with
established Latino populations increases the likelihood that a dense social network will already
be in place – which then works to reduce the financial and emotional stress associated with
moving and finding new employment.
Second, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b) also found that Latinos who did not speak English
well or at all increased rates of violent victimization and economic deprivation when settling
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outside of areas with traditionally large Latino populations. In contrast, Latinos settling in ethnic
communities actually helped lower homicide rates, despite their inability to fluently speak
English. The authors theorize that this inability creates an even greater reliance on the
community and existing social networks to help support those individuals. But, in places without
an established Latino community, these networks are not in place and are therefore unable to
help the non-English speaking Latinos find success in the marketplace and avoid becoming a
victim of violence.
In sum, prior research on immigration and crime has found a positive relationship. Social
Disorganization Theory suggests that immigrants disorganize communities by disrupting the
existence and development of formal and informal ties within the community. More recent
research, however, suggests that the immigration experience of Latino migrants may differ from
those of previous studies. Latino immigrants may actually lower crime in the communities in
which they settle. While this research has been instructive in understanding the immigrationcrime link, it has suffered from several major drawbacks.
2.4: Limitations of Recent Immigration-Crime Research
Although Latino immigrants account for roughly 50% of all recent (since 1980)
immigrants in the United States (U.S. Census 2000), the majority of recent immigration studies
treat all immigrants as one large, undifferentiated group (Lee et al 2001; Reid et al 2005; Ousey
and Kubrin 2009; Stowell et al 2009). Given the unique history of Latino immigration and their
proportion of the United States population, disaggregating immigrants by race/ethnicity would
provide an even greater insight into the immigration-crime link. Furthermore, most studies
examine how immigration affects overall crime rates, rather than disaggregating crime rates as
well (Reid et al 2005; Martinez et al 2008; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Stowell et al 2009). But 86%
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of homicides are intra-racial (Uniform Crime Reports 2009), which suggests it occurs within
macro-social boundaries. Thus, it would be advantageous to determine how Latino immigration
affects Latino homicide rates.
Another major shortcoming of recent research is the lack of geographic scope. Virtually
all research on Latinos and crime focuses on areas that have had large Latino populations for
decades. These areas include places like California (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009), Florida
(Nielsen and Martinez 2009; Olson, Laurikkala, Huff-Corzine, and Corzine 2009; Stowell and
Martinez 2009), Illinois-Chicago (Chavez and Griffiths 2009; Graif and Sampson 2009; Velez
2009), and Texas (Akins, Rumbault, and Stansfield 2009; Valdez, Cepeda, and Kaplan 2009).
Other researchers study multiple areas, but they are almost always found in one of these four
places (Lee et al 2001; Nielsen et al 2005; Martinez et al 2008). Given the protective nature of
ethnic communities described above, one would expect Latinos to have different experiences in
other parts of the country. In fact, researchers have found Latinos in new destinations to be less
integrated into the social and economic mainstream (Leach and Bean 2008), more segregated
from Whites (Lichter et al 2010), and typically rely less on established ethnic enclaves (Leach
and Bean 2008). Hence, it is important to include places with less established Latino populations
and to compare these new destinations with traditional ones. This should include urban as well
as rural areas, given Latinos large population increase in these areas (Saenz and Torres 2003;
Lichter and Johnson 2006).
I attempt to overcome these shortcomings by: (1) racially disaggregating all immigration
measures, (2) racially disaggregating homicide victimization, (3) examining places in new and
traditional destinations, and (4) examining metropolitan and rural areas.
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2.5: Methods
I analyze 919 U.S. counties with at least 1,000 Latinos and for which there was racially
disaggregated homicide data available for 2000. As stated above, recent research on
immigration and crime has been too narrow in scope. Therefore, it is important to examine as
broad a spectrum of places as possible. For this reason, I use U.S. counties instead of cities as
my unit of analysis, which allows me to include a significantly larger sample. I include all
counties with 1,000 Latinos for two primary reasons. First, while Latinos tend to be heavily
concentrated in major metropolitan areas, they have had tremendous growth in rural areas (Saenz
and Torres 2003; Lichter and Johnson 2006). By looking at all counties with 1,000 Latinos
(instead of only major urban areas) I hope to capture more of the Latino experience than previous
research. Second, previous research has found that Latinos impact homicide rates in both rural
and urban areas (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Therefore, both areas should be
included in any study examining the effects of Latinos on homicide.
Data for the dependent variable, Latino homicide victimization, were obtained from the
National Vital Statistics System‟s Multiple Cause-of-Death mortality detail file. These data
come from death certificates filed to the Center for Disease Control by local coroners and
include a wide variety of causes of death, including homicide3. While most prior homicide
research has examined the FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reports or Supplementary Homicide Reports,
neither provides information on Latino offenders or victims4. Vital Statistics, on the other hand,
provides data on Latinos, albeit only victimization data. For this reason, and others, these data
have become more widely used in criminological research (Martinez et al 2008; Loftin,

3

Multiple cause-of-death data include 456 different causes of death. Assault (homicide) is coded as number 432
and encapsulates all other homicide subcategories (such as discharge of firearm, strangulation, blunt object, etc.).
4
In 1980 the FBI attempted to add Latinos to SHR forms, but it was so unsuccessful that they abandoned the
attempt by mid-decade (Fox 2005). See Martinez 1996 for an article that attempted to use this data.
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McDowell and Fetzer 2008; Kposowa, Tsunokai, and McElvain 2006; Wu 2009; Xie 2010;
Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). Furthermore, Martinez et al (2008) note
that while coroner data reflect place of residence, not the place occurrence, for many purposes
they actually provide more accurate and appropriate measures than do the SHR.
In addition to their recent acceptance as a useful data source, I believe these data are
suitable for four reasons. First, since victims and offenders tend to be of similar race/ethnicity
(Boland 1976; O‟Brien 1987; Uniform Crime Reports 2009), it can be reasonably inferred that
victimization data will be similar to offending data, such as the Supplementary Homicide
Reports. In fact, Wiersema et al (2000) found that Supplementary Homicide Reports and Vital
Statistics homicide are highly correlated, especially in places with large populations. Second,
these data do not suffer from missing data problems to the same extent as the Supplementary
Homicide Reports. Third, Arias and Tejada-Vera (2008) find that race and Latino ethnicity
reporting on death certificates is not subject to serious problems of misclassification. Finally,
since death certificates are issued for all deaths, undocumented migrants may also be captured in
these data.
Because homicide is a statistically rare event, homicide counts are averaged over a threeyear period (2000, 2001, 2002) to account for year-to-year fluctuations. In terms of
estimating the models, Osgood (2000) and Osgood and Chambers (2000) argue that macrolevel data with a large number of zero observations often follows a Poisson-like distribution,
and thus estimating with OLS is inappropriate. In order to avoid this problem, I follow the
current convention in the literature and use negative binomial regression analysis to predict
the pooled three-year homicide counts. The negative binomial estimator is the appropriate
choice because it allows for overdispersion in the data. Furthermore, following the method of
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previous research (Messner et al 2005), the negative binomial estimates control for the spatial
“nesting” of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0.
2.5.1: Independent Variable
The main focus of this analysis is Latino immigration. This can be measured as the
proportion of a county‟s Latino population that was born outside of the United States (Latino
immigration). This also includes a significant proportion of undocumented immigrants since, as
Deardorff and Blumerman (2002) found, the 2000 Census captured an estimated 85 to 90% of
the undocumented population. But since all undocumented migrants are not captured, the
measure used in this study should be considered a conservative estimation of Latino
immigration.
As a second measure of immigration, I also disaggregate immigrants by the phase of
Latino immigration in which they entered the United States. First, Immigrants Entered Pre-1985
are Latino immigrants who entered before the significant immigration reform of the late 1980s
and 1990s. Second, Immigrants Entered 1985-1989 are Latino immigrants who entered
following the passage of IRCA in 1986. Finally, Immigrants Entered 1990-2000 are Latino
immigrants who entered during the period of strict border enforcement and when Latino
immigrants began moving to new destinations.
2.5.2: Control Variables
Since Latinos tend to dominate low skill employment, I believe it is important to control
for the baseline local labor market conditions. I define low skill industries as those where 50%
or more of the workers in that sector have no high school diploma. Using the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics‟ Career Guide to Industries (2006), I find the following industries to be low-
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skilled: [Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing], [Mining], [Construction], [Manufacturing],
[Transportation], [Retail Trade], [Accommodation and Food Services], and [Other Services].
Using this criteria to identify low skill industries, I calculate the proportion of all jobs in a city
that are considered low skilled (Low skill Jobs).
Latino Economic Deprivation was obtained by running a principal components factor
analysis with the proportion of Latinos without a high school diploma, the proportion of Latinos
unemployed, the proportion of Latino households headed by a single parent, and the proportion
of all Latinos living in poverty. As measures of social disorganization, I include the proportion
of the population that has moved in the past five years (Moved) and the proportion of all housing
units that are vacant (Vacant Houses). Latinos 15-29 Years Old controls for the age-crime
relationship, while Total Population controls for the size of the county, and Proportion Black
controls for the racial composition. Rural is a dummy variable indicating whether the county is
rural or urban (rural=1). Finally, because high population density may increase the opportunity
for homicide, I include the proportion of housing units that are in clusters of five or more
(Housing Density).
2.5.3: Traditional vs. New Destinations
Given this paper‟s focus on how Latinos,‟ and immigrant Latinos‟, experiences differ
depending on whether they are in a traditional or new Latino destination, it is important to
understand what is meant by “traditional” and “new”. Previous research has defined traditional
and new destinations in two ways. The first method (hereafter called the State Method),
articulated by Massey and Capoferro (2009), defines traditional destinations as those states
containing at least 500,000 Latinos in 1990. These states are California, Texas, New York,
Florida, Illinois, Arizona, and New Mexico. New destination states are defined as states that
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experienced a Latino population increase of at least 100% from 1990 to 2000. These states
include the following: North Carolina, Arkansas Georgia, Tennessee, Nevada, South Carolina,
Alabama, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Mississippi, Oregon, Utah, Delaware, Indiana,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Washington, Virginia, and Kansas. As shown in Table
2.1, none of the traditional states experienced a Latino population growth of at least 100%, so
that there is no overlap between the two definitions. I also include the population growth through
2009 to show that, while new destination states saw a substantial increase in their Latino
population from 1990 to 2000, this growth has continued into the next decade as well.
The second method (hereafter called the County Method) for defining traditional and new
destinations is based on the work of Kandel and Cromartie (2004). I modify their method slightly
in an attempt to bridge the two methods. Rather than looking at states, this method focuses on the
growth in specific counties. According to Kandel and Cromartie, traditional destinations are
counties whose population comprised at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New destinations are defined
as counties that experienced at least a 100% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to
20005.
Unlike the State Method described by Massey and Capoferro (2009), the County Method
does have some counties that are both traditional and new destinations – 31 counties (out of
3,141) had a population that was at least 10% Latino in 1990 and experienced a 100% increase in
their Latino population. In such cases, the counties will be counted as being traditional. Despite
this small amount of overlap, I believe the County Method is the superior of the two measures.

5

Kandel and Cromartie (2004) define new destinations as having a 150% increase in their Latino population. I use
100% to create a method similar to that used by Massey and Capoferro (2009).
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Table 2.1: Latino Population and Percent Change for 1990, 2000, 2009 for U.S. States

Traditional
California
Texas
New York
Florida
Illinois
Arizona
New Mexico
New Destination
North Carolina
Arkansas
Georgia
Tennessee
Nevada
South Carolina
Alabama
Kentucky
Minnesota
Nebraska
Iowa
Mississippi
Oregon
Utah
Delaware
Indiana
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Wisconsin
Washington
Virginia
Kansas

1990
Population

2000
Population

% Change
from 1990
to 2000

2009
Estimated
Population

% Change
from 2000
to 2009

7,687,938
4,339,905
2,214,026
1,574,143
904,446
688,338
579,224

10,966,556
6,669,666
2,867,583
2,682,715
1,530,262
1,295,617
765,386

42.6
53.7
29.5
70.4
69.2
88.2
32.1

13,681,375
9,148,056
3,274,385
3,992,297
1,968,599
2,031,650
915,738

24.8
37.2
14.2
48.8
28.6
56.8
19.6

76,726
19,876
108,922
32,741
124,419
30,551
24,629
21,984
53,884
36,969
32,647
15,931
112,707
84,597
15,820
98,788
86,160
5,252
93,194
214,570
160,288
93,670

378,963
86,866
435,227
123,838
393,970
95,076
75,830
59,939
143,382
94,425
82,473
39,569
275,314
201,559
37,277
214,536
179,304
10,903
192,921
441,509
329,540
188,252

393.9
337.0
299.6
278.2
216.6
211.2
207.9
172.6
166.1
155.4
152.6
148.4
144.3
138.3
135.6
117.2
108.1
107.6
107.0
105.8
105.6
101.0

717,662
172,991
819,887
261,793
700,294
206,760
152,516
115,416
226,384
150,470
134,402
74,447
428,469
343,164
63,892
350,676
301,840
23,455
299,123
687,367
569,921
263,307

89.4
99.1
88.4
111.4
77.8
117.5
101.1
92.6
57.9
59.4
63.0
88.1
55.6
70.3
71.4
63.5
68.3
115.1
55.0
55.7
72.9
39.9

22

The State Method assumes that just because the state as a whole has a large Latino
population, the rest of the state must also. This is not necessarily the case. As Table 2.2 shows,
two “Traditional States” actually had a majority of their counties experience a 100% or greater
increase in their Latino population. The problem is that both states had 50% of its Latino
population living in one large metropolitan area (Miami-Dade County in Florida and Chicago in
Illinois), thus single-handedly defining the entire state as traditional6. Furthermore, there were
four states defined as new destinations that had a minority of their counties experience a 100% or
greater Latino population growth (Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Kansas). Therefore,
all models in the following analysis that examine new and traditional destinations separately use
the County Method7.
2.6: Results
The descriptive statistics provided in Table 2.3 illustrate the differences found between
new and traditional destinations. Although both have similar levels of socioeconomic
disadvantage, there are significant differences in demographic makeup and homicide
victimization. First, the results for Latino Immigration show new destinations have a much less
established Latino population – 46% of Latinos are immigrants, compared to only 24% in
traditional destinations. Furthermore, nearly one-third of all new destination Latinos entered the
country between 1990 and 2000. In traditional areas, only 10% of immigrants entered during the
same period and were just as likely to have entered prior to 1985. In other words, the Latino
population in new destinations is characterized not only by more immigrants, but more recent
immigrants as well.

6
7

New York also had a majority of its Latino population in one metropolitan area – New York City (80%).
All models were run using the State Method as well, with no substantive differences.
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Table 2.2: Latino Population and Percent Change for 1990, 2000 for U.S. States

Traditional
California
Texas
New York*
Florida^
Illinois#
Arizona
New Mexico
New Destination
North Carolina
Arkansas
Georgia
Tennessee
Nevada
South Carolina
Alabama
Kentucky
Minnesota
Nebraska
Iowa
Mississippi
Oregon
Utah
Delaware
Indiana
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Wisconsin
Washington
Virginia
Kansas

1990
Population

2000
Population

% Change
from 1990
to 2000

% of Counties as
New Destinations

7,687,938
4,339,905
2,214,026
1,574,143
904,446
688,338
579,224

10,966,556
6,669,666
2,867,583
2,682,715
1,530,262
1,295,617
765,386

42.6
53.7
29.5
70.4
69.2
88.2
32.1

1.7
24.0
3.0
70.1
50.9
20.0
0.0

76,726
19,876
108,922
32,741
124,419
30,551
24,629
21,984
53,884
36,969
32,647
15,931
112,707
84,597
15,820
98,788
86,160
5,252
93,194
214,570
160,288
93,670

378,963
86,866
435,227
123,838
393,970
95,076
75,830
59,939
143,382
94,425
82,473
39,569
275,314
201,559
37,277
214,536
179,304
10,903
192,921
441,509
329,540
188,252

393.9
337.0
299.6
278.2
216.6
211.2
207.9
172.6
166.1
155.4
152.6
148.4
144.3
138.3
135.6
117.2
108.1
107.6
107.0
105.8
105.6
101.0

91.0
74.7
79.2
73.7
47.1
76.1
74.6
68.3
69.0
51.6
67.7
69.5
58.3
62.1
66.7
53.2
36.3
36.3
66.7
61.5
62.2
36.2

*NEW YORK: 2.1 million in New York city (80%)
^FLORIDA: 1.3 million in Miami-Dade county (50%)
#ILLINOIS: 750,000 in Chicago (50%)
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for Latinos in U.S. Counties,
2000
All Counties

Traditional
Destinations
Mean
S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Latino Less than
High School#
Latino Unemployment

.46

.17

.51

.05

.03

Latino Single Headed
Households
Latino Poverty

.14

New Destinations
Mean

S.D.

.13

.51

.17

.06

.02

.05

.03

.05

.14

.04

.14

.05

.23

.09

.26

.07

.24

.09

Latinos 15-29 Years Old

24.78

3.39

.25

.04

.33

.06

Latino Homicide
Victimization Rate*
Proportion Black

6.54

10.11

5.67

5.81

8.44

13.08

.09

.11

.05

.07

.10

.12

200,137

451,837

260,504

812,951

152,895

205,067

Rural County (Rural=1)

.42

.49

.60

.49

.39

.49

Housing Density

.10

.09

.09

.12

.10

.07

Vacant Houses

.11

.08

.15

.09

.10

.07

Moved

.21

.08

.20

.08

.23

.07

Proportion of Jobs Low
skilled
Latino Immigration

.57

.08

.55

.07

.59

.07

.34

.18

.24

.15

.46

.15

Immigrants Entered

.19

.15

.10

.08

.30

.14

.05

.03

.04

.03

.07

.03

.09

.05

.10

.06

.09

.04

Total Population

1990-2000
Immigrants Entered
1985-1989
Immigrants Entered pre1985
(N=)

919

215

296

# Latino economic deprivation measures (high school, unemployment, single headed households and poverty) are
listed separately for descriptive purposes, but in the multivariate analysis they are combined into a single factor. See
methods section for more detail.
*Homicide is expressed as a rate in the descriptive table, but is entered as counts in the negative binomial regression.
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Table 2.3 also shows significant differences in the homicide victimization rates for
Latinos in traditional and new destinations. In fact, the homicide rate is nearly 50% higher in
new destinations (8.44) than traditional (5.67). One possible explanation for this difference is the
age distribution of Latinos in both areas. One in three Latinos in new destinations is between the
ages of 15 and 29, compared to only one in four for traditional areas. Given the historically
strong correlation between age and crime, this could possibly explain the homicide differences.
However, even age-standardized rates show greater victimization rates in new destinations (7.28
compared to 5.80 in traditional areas, not reported)8. This important difference is masked in
violence rates that are undifferentiated by region.
Table 2.4 provides results of three models testing the immigration-crime link by
controlling for the proportion of the Latino population that is foreign-born. Models 1 and 2
examine all counties together and traditional counties only, respectively, and find no effect for
immigration. However, Model 3 limits the sample to new destination counties and finds that
Latino homicide victimization increases with Latino immigration (2.08). To evaluate the
strength of the relationship, the coefficients are converted to a proportion9. This calculation
shows that a one standard deviation increase in Latino immigration is associated with a 36.6%
increase in Latino homicide victimization.
Table 2.5 examines new destination counties and takes the immigration variable a step
further by breaking it down by the period in which the immigrant entered the country. Model 1
examines the effects of immigrants who entered during the period of intense border enforcement
(1990-2000). As suggested by Table 2.4, immigration is associated with an increase in Latino

8

Age-standardized rates were calculated using the method described by Shryock et al (1976) on pages 240-245.
This is done by using the formula (eb*s-1)*100, where b is the coefficient and s is the standard deviation of the
variable in question. In this case, Latino Immigration.
9
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Table 2.4: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide
Victimization in U.S. Counties, 2000

Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Latinos 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Latino Economic Deprivation
Proportion Black
Rural
Latino Immigration
N

All Counties
Model 1

Traditional
Counties
Model 2

New Destination
Counties
Model 3

1.71***
(0.22)
-0.20
(1.62)
-2.25**
(1.02)
1.61
(1.14)
-7.62***
(1.87)
-1.07
(1.63)
0.48***
(0.10)
0.05
(0.66)
-0.41†
(0.25)
0.52
(0.71)
919

0.90***
(0.23)
-5.02***
(1.25)
-4.38**
(2.01)
0.57
(0.95)
-2.12
(3.54)
-4.24
(2.91)
0.21***
(0.06)
-2.45
(1.64)
-1.35***
(0.37)
-0.68
(0.67)
215

2.85***
(0.39)
2.76
(1.76)
-2.11
(1.77)
1.51
(1.87)
-8.64***
(2.72)
2.83†
(1.61)
0.45***
(0.11)
2.58***
(0.85)
-0.19
(0.35)
2.08***
(0.66)
296

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0. Standard
deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10

victimization (3.24). In fact, the effect is even stronger than in the previous table – a one standard
deviation increase in immigration from 1990-2000 is associated with a 57% increase in
victimization. Model 2 focuses on immigration following the passage of IRCA (1985-1989) and
also finds a positive association with homicide (6.75), but the effect is much smaller (22% per
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standard deviation increase). Finally, Model 3 controls for immigrants who entered before major
changes in immigration policy occurred (prior to 1985) and finds no relationship between
immigration and crime. This suggests that Latino immigration in general is not necessarily
related to Latino homicide victimization – it depends on when the immigrants entered the
country.
With this in mind, Table 2.6 returns the focus to traditional destinations, now controlling
for period specific immigration. The results, however, remain the same as Table 2.4. All three
models find no relationship between immigration and homicide – regardless of the period in
which the immigrants entered. Nevertheless, this is an important finding for several reasons.
First, it shows the importance of examining where immigrants settle, in addition to when they
entered. Second, these findings also show that immigrants, even very recent immigrants, do not
socially disorganize all the communities in which they settle. Some communities appear better
prepared to handle the potentially disorganizing effect of an increase in immigration. The
implications of this and other findings are discussed in the next section.
2.7: Discussion and Conclusion
Since the mid-1980s, the pattern of settlement by Latino migrants has changed
dramatically. These migrants are now settling in parts of the United States that have never before
had significant Latino populations. This has led many to fear an increase in crime.
Unfortunately, early explanations of immigration and crime focused on the experience of Eastern
European immigrants. Therefore, it has not been clear whether the experience of Latino
immigrants could be explained in the same way – especially with some researchers finding that
immigrants now lower crime rates. However, the most recent research on immigration has failed
to analyze any of the new areas of settlement. This study not only examines these new areas, it
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also focuses on exclusively on Latinos and disaggregates immigration by the year of entrance to
the United States.

Table 2.5: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide
Victimization in 296 New Destination U.S. Counties, 2000
Latino Homicide
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Latinos 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Latino Economic Deprivation
Proportion Black
Rural
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000
Immigrants Entered 1985-1989
Immigrants Entered pre1985

2.82***
(0.39)
2.80†
(1.62)
-1.81
(1.68)
1.70
(2.04)
-11.21***
(3.08)
2.56†
(1.55)
0.45***
(0.11)
2.47***
(0.79)
-0.19
(0.35)
3.24***
(0.71)
---------

Latino Homicide
Model 2

Latino Homicide
Model 3

3.00***
(0.40)
3.13†
(1.69)
-2.04
(1.92)
1.29
(1.89)
-5.97**
(2.98)
3.59**
(1.53)
0.42***
(0.10)
2.99***
(0.92)
-0.18
(0.36)
-----

2.99***
(0.41)
3.51**
(1.63)
-2.34
(1.85)
1.77
(2.00)
-6.11**
(3.17)
4.10***
(1.40)
0.45***
(0.11)
3.00***
(0.93)
-0.08
(0.35)
-----

6.75**
(2.85)
-----

-----2.13
(3.07)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0. Standard
deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10
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Table 2.6: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide
Victimization in 215 Traditional U.S. Counties, 2000
Latino Homicide
Model 1
Total Population#

Immigrants Entered 1985-1989

0.87***
(0.23)
-5.01***
(1.27)
-4.44**
(1.93)
0.75
(1.05)
-1.19
(3.17)
-4.09
(3.06)
0.20***
(0.07)
-2.37
(1.62)
-1.35***
(0.38)
-2.01
(1.67)
-----

Immigrants Entered pre1985

-----

Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Latinos 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Latino Economic Deprivation
Proportion Black
Rural
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000

Latino Homicide
Model 2

Latino Homicide
Model 3

0.90***
(0.23)
-5.01***
(1.20)
-4.37**
(2.05)
0.50
(0.88)
-2.37
(3.49)
-4.31
(2.82)
0.21***
(0.06)
-2.49
(1.64)
-1.36***
(0.37)
-----

0.87***
(0.22)
-4.93***
(1.25)
-4.27**
(2.05)
0.41
(0.87)
-2.97
(3.78)
-4.51
(2.76)
0.20***
(0.07)
-2.38
(1.73)
-1.33***
(0.36)
-----

-3.27
(3.03)
-----

-----0.53
(1.15)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0. Standard
deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10

I observe the following findings: (1) Latino homicide victimization, on average, is higher
in new destination than traditional counties. (2) Latino immigration is positively correlated with
victimization in new destination, but not traditional, counties. (3) When disaggregating
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immigration by the period in which the migrant entered the U.S., only immigrants entering after
1985 are associated with greater homicide in new destinations. (4) Even when disaggregating
immigration by year of entry, it is still not correlated with homicide in traditional areas. I draw
several implications from these findings.
First, these findings show the importance of taking into account changes in immigration
policy when examining the impact of immigration on crime rates. Major policy changes, like
IRCA and strict border enforcement, alter the migration experience for many immigrants.
Including a general immigration measure fails to capture these subtle, or sometimes obvious,
differences.
Second, the findings highlight the importance of recognizing what appears to be a
growing bifurcation in the Latino community. The impact of immigration clearly varies
depending on whether the county is a traditional or new Latino destination. The findings of
previous researchers suggesting that immigration does not impact crime rates are not surprising
given that they have focused almost exclusively on traditional destinations. Those findings
coalesce with the results presented in this paper concerning traditional areas, but they fail to
recognize the significant effect of immigration outside of these areas. This begs the question:
why are traditional and new destinations differentially affected by Latino immigration? And,
why is the impact limited to recent (post 1985) immigrants?
As outlined previously in the paper, the most popular explanation for the positive
relationship between immigration and crime is Social Disorganization Theory. Although the
idea that the influx of immigrants into a community hinders its ability to regulate itself was
developed to explain the effect of Eastern European immigrants nearly a century, it still appears
to hold some relevance today. This explanation may very well explain why Latino crime rates are
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higher in new destinations - but it clearly does not hold up in traditional areas. Assuming Social
Disorganization Theory does explain the positive relationship between immigration and crime,
the question remains – why are immigrants not disorganizing communities in traditional
destinations?
One explanation, discussed previously, points to the benefits provided by ethnic
communities. The idea is that traditional areas are not affected by immigration because their
Latino populations have been established and have developed highly intricate social networks
and the institutions necessary for community success. With these networks and institutions in
place, immigrants are effortlessly absorbed into the community. New destinations, in contrast,
lack these beneficial elements and are therefore unable to help newly arrived migrants adjust to
community life – with one consequence being increased homicide victimization in the
community.
But this still does not explain why only the most recent immigrants are associated with
higher levels of violence in new destinations. If the lack of community institutions and social
networks explain the increase in violence, why do immigrants entering prior to 1985 not have a
similar effect? Perhaps it is not only the destination of the migrants that explains their impact on
violence, but also their origin. In the following section I provide additional analysis for a
preliminary explanation to this question that examines changing emigration patterns within
Mexico.
2.8: Additional Analysis
The data presented in this section were obtained from three data sources: the Mexican
Migration Project (MMP)10, the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografica (INEGI), and the

10

The MMP is a survey of Mexican immigrants about their migration experiences. It was started in 1982 by Jorge
Durand and Douglas S. Massey and includes over 7,000 interviews. See http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/home-en.aspx
for more information.
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Consejo Nacional de Poblacion (CONAPO)11. Data from the MMP were used to determine
where the migrant settled in the United States12, what year they migrated, and the Mexican state
in which they were born. Data from INEGI and CONAPO were used to calculate a state-level
homicide rate for all 32 Mexican states for the years 1990-1994. The data below examine the 16
states with the highest homicide rates – hereafter called Violent States13.
To begin, the purpose of this analysis is to determine if changing patterns of emigration
from Mexico may help explain the relationship between Latino immigration and homicide
victimization in the United States. The analysis reveals several important findings. First, the
MMP data reflect the changing Latino settlement patterns captured by the U.S. Census. Prior to
1985, 5.5% of all migrants interviewed by the MMP settled in new destination states. After 1990,
this number rose to 17.3%. Regardless of the cause, it is clear that a shift in settlement patterns
did occur.
Second, the MMP also reveals a shift in where the migrants were coming from in
Mexico. Prior to 1985, 34.7% of all interviewed migrants were born in Violent States. After
1990, this number jumps to 40%. While the raw differences might not be significant, any shift
might have important implications for Latinos in the United States – several of which are
detailed below.
Finally, the MMP also provides important information about where migrants from
Violent States settled. Of all the migrants interviewed who settled in traditional destinations,
40.6% came from Violent States. In contrast, 44.2% of migrants settling in new destinations
were born in a Violent State.
11

INEGI and CONAPO are Mexican government agencies charged with collecting official statistics. Homicide data
were obtained from INEGI and population data were obtained from CONAPO.
12
New and traditional destinations were determined using the State Method (see Methods section for details) due to
the nature of the information available from the MMP.
13
I also limited my analysis to the 10 highest, but the differences were not substantively different.
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All these differences, despite appearing to be minor, may have important consequences
for Latinos in the United States. As discussed previously, only recent immigrants settling in new
destinations had a significant impact on homicide rates. This may be explained, at least partially,
by an increase in the number of migrants coming from Violent States. First, consider how
traditional destinations might be affected by this increase. The simplest answer is that traditional
communities would merely absorb the newcomers, with no noticeable negative effects. Given the
already large number of Latinos living in these areas, the increase in migrants from Violent
States may be no more than “a drop in the bucket”. A second explanation, similar to the first, is
that the amount of resources available in traditional destinations (i.e. strong social networks and
established community institutions) may allow the community to, once again, absorb the
newcomers with no ill effects. So, not only is the number of migrants from Violent States smaller
in traditional destinations, these places may already be in a position to negate any potentially
negative effects associated with the change.
New destinations, however, lack the number of Latinos and built-in resources of
traditional areas. According to the analysis provided earlier in the paper, immigrants entering the
United States prior to 1985 have no effect on homicide rates in new destinations – much like in
traditional destinations. This is likely due to the relatively low number of migrants settling from
Violent States. Therefore, once the emigration patterns in Mexico shifted more to Violent States,
new destinations were not able to handle these newcomers – thus leading to higher homicide
victimization. This is not to say, however, that these recent migrants are more violent than their
predecessors and are committing more crimes. Given the violence in their home states, these
immigrants are exposed to more violence than those who came before them. It is possible that
they are more accepting of violence or perhaps less sensitive to it. If this is the case, they will be
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much less likely to intervene when they see something bad happening in their new community.
This, according to Social Disorganization Theory, is one of the strongest predictors of
community violence.
In summary, there has been a shift in the emigration patterns within Mexico. Migrants
entering the United States after 1990 are more likely to come from Violent States, who are then
more likely to settle in new destinations. Given the small number of Latinos and the lack of
community resources in these areas, they are much more susceptible to any potentially negative
effects of this shift in migration patterns.
It should be noted that this analysis is in no way exhaustive. Hopefully it presents just as
many questions as answers. It is up to future researchers to determine whether this is the best
explanation for the effect recent immigrants have in new destinations. Regardless of the reason,
it remains to be seen whether this pattern continues. Drug wars in Mexico near the end of the
2000s may change emigration patterns again, or it might completely change the Mexican states
which are considered “Violent”. Furthermore, future research must determine how long it takes
a community to become a “traditional destination”. After 10-15 years of Latinos settling in new
destinations, will those communities be considered traditional by 2010? Or does the process take
longer than that? With 10-15 years of establishing social networks and the institutions necessary
for a community to be successful, will the homicide rates in new destinations decline by 2010?
These are just a few of the questions researchers should strive to answer in the near future.
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CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION, SEGREGATION, AND U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY –
EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF LATINO-LATINO INTERACTION ON HOMICIDE
VICTIMIZATION

3.1: Introduction
During the latter part of the 20th Century, the United States saw a significant shift in its
demographic makeup. The majority of the change was due to the massive influx of Latinos into
the country. Though the history of Latino immigration to the United States can be traced back to
the early 1900s, the most dramatic changes have occurred in the last two decades of the century,
Prior to the mid-1980s, Latino immigration to the United States was driven by dramatic
changes in labor demand brought on by two World Wars and the United States government‟s
numerous attempts to control the number and race/ethnicity of the immigrants entering the
country. But as Massey and Capoferro (2009) point out, the most significant changes in Latino
immigration have occurred over the past 20-30 years. These changes can be almost entirely
attributed three major developments. The effects of the first two, the militarization of the U.S.Mexico border and the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), have been
twofold. First, both measures have dramatically increased the Latino population in the United
States through mass legalizations and by increasing the difficulty of entering and exiting the
United States, respectively. Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has
more than tripled from 14.5 million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008).
Second, militarizing the border and IRCA encouraged immigrants to settle in new places
by shutting down traditional entry points and by providing newly legal immigrants with greater
geographic mobility, respectively. The third major development, the passage of Proposition 187,
has also encouraged immigrants to settle in new places by effectively telling new migrants that
they were no longer welcome in California. As a direct result of these developments, the
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majority of Latino immigrants are settling outside of California and Texas for the first time in
U.S. history.
The massive influx of Latinos into the United States has led many to fear an increase in
crime. Determining what structural variables help explain Latino homicide offending and
victimization is one of the neglected challenges facing criminologists today – especially
considering how little we know about Latino crime compared to whites and blacks (Phillips
2002). Although research on Latino homicide has only recently been given attention in the
criminological literature, what little research that has been done has shown not only that
predictors of black and white crime do not necessarily predict Latino crime (Martinez 1996; Lee
et al 2001; Dugan and Apel 2003; Nielsen, Lee, and Martinez 2005; Nielsen, Martinez, and Lee
2005), but also the differences between whites and blacks are not due to the same factors as the
differences between whites and Latinos (Phillips 2002; McNulty and Bellair 2003). Part of the
problem may be the unique role that immigration has played in the history of U.S. Latinos, as
outlined above.
The influx of immigrants and the rise of urbanization in the early part of the 20th century
helped lead to the core ideas in Social Disorganization Theory. First, immigration and
urbanization were viewed as having a negative overall impact on communities (Park and Burgess
1925; Wirth 1938), and was latter linked specifically to crime (Shaw and McKay 1942). Two
schools of social disorganization developed early on. The first included researchers like Louis
Wirth (1938), who believed that neighborhoods were being negatively impacted by (a)
increasing population, (b) ethnic heterogeneity, and (c) settlement density. The other school,
starting with the work of Park and Burgess (1925), did not believe “urbanism” was harming
neighborhoods; rather residential instability was the culprit. Later researchers, such as Shaw
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and McKay (1942), would take ideas from both schools and apply Social Disorganization Theory
to the study of crime.
But attempts to link Latino immigration and crime have suffered from several major
drawbacks. First, researchers tend to group all immigrants together, rather than look at Latino or
other immigrant groups separately. Similarly, most immigration-crime research has examined
immigration‟s effects on overall crime rates, rather than racially/ethnically disaggregated rates.
Given that 86% of homicides are intra-racial (Uniform Crime Reports 2009), this is especially
important. Second, as Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c: 337) point out, most previous research on
Latino immigration has focused on “old, safe, and relatively well-organized places.” While this
might be useful in determining the effects of ethnic communities on the immigration-crime link,
it does not provide much insight into what happens when Latinos venture outside of these
traditional destinations. Finally, given the new settlement patterns of Latino immigrants, it is
important for researchers to recognize that segregation may play an important role is how these
migrants fare in their new communities.
Although segregation has been found to increase crime for all races/ethnicities
(Feldmeyer 2010), most researchers have focused on its effects on blacks (Messner and South
1986; Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Lee and Ousey 2005). This is due, in
part, to their consistently high levels of segregation and socioeconomic disadvantage. Though
many theories have been offered to explain how segregation has such a profound effect on black
communities, most seem to focus on how it isolates blacks from mainstream society (Anderson
1994; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996). Despite having segregation and disadvantage levels close to
those of blacks, Latinos have been virtually ignored in the segregation-crime literature (see
Feldmeyer 2010; Xie 2010 for exceptions). Building on previous research, and taking into
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account the importance of immigration to many Latino communities, I examine how Latinos are
affected by being segregated from whites and the effects of immigrant Latinos isolation from
native Latinos. The latter is especially important since the potentially beneficial relationships
created in ethnic communities might never be formed if the two groups are isolated from one
another.
Another way to examine segregation is to measure concentrations of poverty for
racial/ethnic groups. Most research on concentrated poverty has focused on blacks, with two
major theories emerging. One points to social isolation as the cause of poverty concentration in
black communities (Wilson 1987; 1996), while the other cites segregation has the primary cause
(Massey and Denton 1993). Regardless of the cause, it remains clear that the effects are negative
for both blacks (Krivo and Peterson 1996; 1999; Lee 2000; Parker and Reckdenwald 2008;
Akins 2009; Eitle 2009) and whites (Peterson and Krivo 1999; Lee 2000; Krivo and Peterson
2000). What is not clear, however, is the effect it has on Latinos. Research regarding this
relationship has been mixed, with some finding no effect (Eschbach et al 2004; Emeka 2006) and
others finding negative effects (Jargowsky 2009). Hence, it is vital that research on Latino
homicide include measures of concentrated poverty for Latinos.
Therefore, this paper attempts to overcome the shortcomings of previous research by: (1)
racially disaggregating all immigration measures, (2) racially disaggregating homicide
victimization, (3) examining places in new and traditional destinations, (4) examining
metropolitan and rural areas, and (5) controlling for Latino-White segregation, Latino-Latino
segregation, and concentrations of poverty.
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3.2: Latino Immigration in the 20th Century
The history of Latino immigration to the United States in the 20th century, while brief
compared to that of European immigration, has been rich and eventful. Although Latino
immigrants, and immigrants in general, come from many different countries (see Charts 3.1 and
3.2), most U.S. immigration policies have targeted Mexican migration and the U.S.-Mexico
border (Durand et al 2000; Massey and Capoferro 2009). Mexican migration to the United States
has had one constant: labor demand.

Chart 3.1: U.S. Immigrant Population by Region of Origin, 2000
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Chart 3.2: U.S. Latino and Latino Immigrant Population by Country of Origin, 2000
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A series of immigration acts at the beginning of the 20th century worked to limit
immigration from countries that were traditional sources of labor. Two pre-World War I
measures, the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the Gentlemen‟s Agreement with Japan, effectively
cutoff employers from their primary source of agricultural and railroad workers (GuerinGonzales 1994). Following World War I, Congress passed the Immigration Acts of 1921 and
1924, enacting a quota system to regulate the number of immigrants allowed from each country.
Because of the difficulty in regulating overland borders, and the ease of regulating seaports, the
quotas were a de facto restriction of all immigrant groups, except those from Mexico (Ngai
1999). These immigration measures forced many business owners to turn to Mexican workers to
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meet their labor demands. Although Mexican migration to the United States during the 1910s
and 1920s was less than half of what it would be over the next several decades, it marked the
first major influx, and recruitment, of Mexican workers into the United States.
The next major period in Mexican migration began in the 1940s with the United States‟
involvement in World War II. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States began
mobilizing for war, dramatically increasing the demand for labor in all sectors. In order to meet
this new demand for workers, United States employers once again turned to Mexican workers.
Enacted in 1942, the Bracero Accords brought Mexican farm workers to the United States under
supervision of the U.S. government (Craig 1971) by promising “minimum wages, adequate
living conditions, and the right to end their participation in the program and return to Mexico”
(Garcia 2002:31). The program was so successful that it lasted until 1964, despite being enacted
as a wartime measure (Calavita 1992), and provided work for an estimated 4.8 million Mexican
workers (Cerrutti and Massey 2006).
The end of the Bracero Accords in 1964 may have brought an end to government
sponsored Mexican immigration, but it did not stop migration altogether. After two decades of
using Mexican workers to fill their labor needs, many U.S. business owners continued recruiting
Mexican workers despite their lack of legal documents. Demand for unskilled labor continued
into the 1970s and 1980s, leading to an increase in undocumented migration that has continued
to the present.
Prior to the 1980s, Mexican migration followed two distinct patterns. First, nearly 80% of
all Mexican migrants settled in just two states: California and Texas (Durand et al 2000). This, in
essence, made immigration a regional rather than a national phenomenon for the United States.
Second, Latino immigration was typically a circular process. Migrants came to the United States
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temporarily in order to earn enough wages to fund a project back home, such as a car, a house, or
a business (Durand and Massey 2006). This circular process was disrupted during the early
1990s by a new border enforcement policy that became known as “prevention through
deterrence” (Massey and Capoferro 2009). In 1993, Operation Blockade was launched in El
Paso, Texas and Operation Gatekeeper the following year in San Diego, California. Both
Operations sought to prevent border crossings through militarization and fence building. As a
result, border crossings at El Paso and San Diego were virtually eliminated (Nevins 2002),
making entry into the United States and Mexico more difficult.
With the militarization of the border making trips to and from Mexico riskier, more
migrants began to settle permanently in the United States rather than risk not being able to return
at some future date. This, coupled with the three million immigrants naturalized with the
passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, has led to a dramatic increase in the
U.S. Latino population. Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has
more than tripled from 14.5 million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008),
surpassing blacks as the nation‟s largest minority.
A second major change in Latino immigration in the past two and a half decades has been
its geographic diversification. As stated above, prior to Operations Blockade and Gatekeeper,
42% of all Latino immigrants, and 77% of Mexican immigrants, settled in California and Texas.
That number had dropped to 32% and 48%, respectively, by 2005, meaning that Latinos, and
Mexicans in particular, have begun to settle outside of their traditional destinations.
Massey and Capoferro (2009) outline several reasons for this diversification. First, there
are the effects of the aforementioned Operation Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper. By taking
away the most popular entry points in Texas and California, immigrants were forced to cross at
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other, less visible, and less used points along the U.S.-Mexico border. New entry points meant
new destinations.
Second, the mass legalizations as a result of the Immigration and Reform Control Act
(IRCA)14 flooded local labor markets - especially in California, which accounted for 54% of all
legalizations. As a result, undocumented migrants, who were previously limited in their
employment opportunities, were now free to find employment wherever they liked. This
effectively flooded California‟s labor market, making it a less attractive destination for newly
arrived immigrants. Furthermore, the acquisition of legal documents gave immigrants greater
geographic mobility, many of whom decided to move elsewhere to find employment.
Third, the passage of Proposition 187 in California also contributed to Latinos‟
geographic diversification. In the early 1990s, California suffered from severe economic
recession. Many residents, including Governor Pete Wilson, blamed many of the state‟s
problems on immigrants. This culminated in the passage of Proposition 187, which did the
following: (1) stop undocumented migrants from using social services, (2) required state and
local authorities to report suspected illegal aliens, and (3) made the sale or use of false
citizenship documents a felony offense (Calavita 1996). While most of its provisions were
declared unconstitutional in subsequent court battles, it sent a clear and strong message to
potential migrants that they were no longer welcome.
Finally, while California‟s economy sputtered, other state economies across the country
grew robustly. This lured young, male, foreign-born Latino migrants away from traditional
destinations in search of better opportunities elsewhere (Durand et al 2000; Lichter and Johnson
2006).
14

IRCA addressed immigration in three major ways: (1) legalize all illegal immigrants residing the United States,
(2) penalize employers for hiring workers without proof of citizenship, and (3) increase federal funding for guarding
the border.
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These are just a few possible explanations for the geographic dispersal of Latinos;
undoubtedly the cause is a mix of these and other factors. The fact remains, however, that
Latinos are now more spread out across the United States than ever before. Settling in new and
unfamiliar places poses many new problems for Latinos, several of which will be examined in
this paper.
3.3: Latino Immigration and Crime
As Latino immigrants continue to spread across the United States, scholars have once
again begun to analyze the link between immigration and crime. The idea that immigration and
crime are positively linked has a long history in sociological research. At the beginning of the
20th century, many Eastern European immigrants (Rubin 1941) and southern blacks (Grossman
1991) migrated to central and northeast regions of the United States. Since many of these
migrants often settled in less desirable, crime ridden neighborhoods, many people began to
worry there might be an “immigrant problem” (Leuchtenberg 1958). Early explanations were
steeped heavily in Social Darwinism – suggesting that immigrants were culturally and
biologically inferior to natives (Coser 1977).
By the 1930s, several researchers began to develop socially and ecologically driven
theories to explain the social pathologies besetting immigrants. Shaw and McKay (1942), in a
landmark study, began mapping juvenile delinquency in Chicago neighborhoods. They noticed
that high rates of delinquency seemed to plague only a small number of neighborhoods.
Furthermore, they found that this small group of neighborhoods was experiencing persistently
high crime rates, despite a rapidly changing population. In these neighborhoods, crime
perpetuated from one generation to the next and one group of immigrants to the next. Shaw and
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McKay felt that the only constant, the neighborhoods themselves, must be the key to explaining
the high rates of delinquency.
Concentric Zone Theory, developed by Park and Burgess (1925), supported the findings
of Shaw and McKay. It posits that when a city is fully developed, it will take on the form of five
concentric rings with social and physical conditions declining as one gets closer to the city
center. Park and Burgess argued that the ring nearest the city center (Transitional Zone) would be
the least desirable – deteriorating houses, abandoned buildings, and factories would be abundant.
Because the area was so undesirable, housing was cheap – allowing immigrants to settle in large
numbers.
Shaw and McKay‟s maps of Chicago showed that immigrants, and juvenile delinquency,
were, in fact, concentrated in the Transitional Zone. Furthermore, they found that these
neighborhoods had a very high rate of population turnover – which Shaw and McKay found to
be one of the keys to explaining the high rates of crime. Their theory, which would become
known as Social Disorganization Theory, viewed communities as a dense network of formal and
informal ties that linked people and organizations together. These ties help the community reach
common goals – like fighting crime and following a path of conformity (Kasarda and Janowitz
1974). But, large changes over a short period of time – like immigrants pouring into a
community – disrupt the neighborhood‟s ability to regulate itself (Kornhauser 1978; Bankston
1998). This was illustrated by Thomas and Znaniecki‟s (1958) seminal study of Polish
immigrants in America.
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Immigration, therefore, is thought to socially disorganize a community by disrupting social
ties through ethnic heterogeneity and population turnover15. But it appears that the link between
modern immigration, particularly Latino immigration, and crime may not follow the same
pattern. Among immigrants as a whole, there is mixed evidence that they contribute to crime.
Some studies report a positive association between immigration and crime (O‟Kane 1992;
Tanton and Lutton 1993; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson 2006) while some do not (Butcher and
Piehl 1998; Martinez 2000; Lee et al 2001; Reid et al 2005). In contrast, the assumption that
Latino immigration disorganizes communities and raises crime seems widely disconfirmed
(Martinez and Lee 1998; Martinez et al 2003; Stowell and Martinez 2007; Stowell and Martinez
2009; Desmond and Kubrin 2009). In fact, research by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) suggests
that Latinos‟ geographic mobility actually works to lower Latino homicide victimization rates.
Some researchers have gone so far as to suggest that Latino immigration was one of the
main forces behind the significant crime decline in the United States during the late 1990s.
Sampson (2006; 2008) points out that the crime decline occurred at precisely the same time that
millions of Latino immigrants were pouring into the United States. Furthermore, as immigration
began to level off, so too did crime. This further fueled debate over whether there was a “Latino
Paradox”; that Latinos‟ level of mortality - homicide included - was not as high as their levels of
socioeconomic disadvantage would predict (Abraido-Lanza et al 1999; Smith and Bradshaw
2006; Turra and Elo 2008).
One explanation for this paradox points to the benefits provided by ethnic communities,
which Portes and Jensen (1992) describe as “a network of small enterprises that offer
employment comparable to those of the mainstream economy…[and] this network creates new
15

Although this paper focuses exclusively on Social Disorganization as the theoretical framework for explaining the
immigration-crime relationship, there are a number of other explanations. See Ousey and Kurbin (2009) for a review
of other theoretical approaches.
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entrepreneurial opportunities for newcomers – opportunities that are absent elsewhere (p.420).
These communities make assimilation easier, not only on a cultural level, but also in the job
market – particularly for Latinos who have not yet mastered the English language. In a series of
papers that examines Latino homicide and migration patterns, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b;
2010c) show how moving into established Latino communities can help reduce exposure to
violence.
First, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) found that when Latinos move into a part of a city
that already had a relatively large Latino population, Latino homicide victimization and
economic deprivation decreases. The authors suggest that moving into neighborhoods with
established Latino populations increases the likelihood that a dense social network will already
be in place – which then works to reduce the financial and emotional stress associated with
moving and finding new employment.
Second, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b) also found that Latinos who did not speak English
well or at all increased rates of violent victimization and economic deprivation when settling
outside of areas with traditionally large Latino populations. In contrast, Latinos settling in ethnic
communities actually helped lower homicide rates, despite their inability to fluently speak
English. The authors theorize that this inability creates an even greater reliance on the
community and existing social networks to help support those individuals. But, in places without
an established Latino community, these networks are not in place and are therefore unable to
help the non-English speaking Latinos find success in the marketplace and avoid becoming a
victim of violence.
In sum, prior research on immigration and crime has found a positive relationship. Social
Disorganization Theory suggests that immigrants disorganize communities by disrupting the
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existence and development of formal and informal ties within the community. More recent
research, however, suggests that the immigration experience of Latino migrants may differ from
those of previous studies. Latino immigrants may actually lower crime in the communities in
which they settle. While this research has been instructive in understanding the immigrationcrime link, it has suffered from several major drawbacks.
3.4: Limitations of Immigration-Crime Research
Although Latino immigrants account for roughly 50% of all recent (since 1980)
immigrants in the United States (U.S. Census 2000), the majority of recent immigration studies
treat all immigrants as one large, undifferentiated group (Lee et al 2001; Reid et al 2005; Ousey
and Kubrin 2009; Stowell et al 2009). Given the unique history of Latino immigration and their
proportion of the United States population, disaggregating immigrants by race/ethnicity would
provide an even greater insight into the immigration-crime link. Furthermore, most studies
examine how immigration affects overall crime rates, rather than disaggregating crime rates as
well (Reid et al 2005; Martinez et al 2008; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Stowell et al 2009). But 86%
of homicides are intra-racial (Uniform Crime Reports 2009), which suggests it occurs within
macro-social boundaries. Thus, it would be advantageous to determine how Latino immigration
affects Latino homicide rates.
Another major shortcoming of recent research is the lack of geographic scope. Virtually
all research on Latinos and crime focuses on areas that have had large Latino populations for
decades. These areas include places like California (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009), Florida
(Nielsen and Martinez 2009; Olson, Laurikkala, Huff-Corzine, and Corzine 2009; Stowell and
Martinez 2009), Illinois-Chicago (Chavez and Griffiths 2009; Graif and Sampson 2009; Velez
2009), and Texas (Akins, Rumbault, and Stansfield 2009; Valdez, Cepeda, and Kaplan 2009).
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Other researchers study multiple areas, but they are almost always found in one of these four
places (Lee et al 2001; Nielsen et al 2005; Martinez et al 2008). Given the protective nature of
ethnic communities described above, one would expect Latinos to have different experiences in
other parts of the country. In fact, researchers have found Latinos in new destinations to be less
integrated into the social and economic mainstream (Leach and Bean 2008), more segregated
from Whites (Lichter et al 2010), and typically rely less on established ethnic enclaves (Leach
and Bean 2008). Hence, it is important to include places with less established Latino populations
and to compare these new destinations with traditional ones. This should include urban as well
as rural areas, given Latinos large population increase in these areas (Saenz and Torres 2003;
Lichter and Johnson 2006).
I attempt to overcome these shortcomings by: (1) racially disaggregating all immigration
measures, (2) racially disaggregating homicide victimization, (3) examining places in new and
traditional destinations, and (4) examining metropolitan and rural areas.
3.5: Latino Segregation and Crime
Since the early 1990s, sociologists have consistently found that segregation has caused a
myriad of social problems, including social isolation, concentrated disadvantage, and crime
(Massey and Denton 1993; Peterson and Krivo 1999; Massey 2001) for all racial/ethnic groups
(Krivo et al 2009). Of particular interest has been the effect of segregation from whites on black
homicide rates. Regardless of the particular measure of segregation used (unevenness vs.
isolation) or the decade being studied, segregation has been consistently linked with higher rates
of violence in black communities (Messner and South 1986; Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh
and Flynn 1996; Lee and Ousey 2005).
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Blacks have been of particular interest to researchers partly because they have had
consistently higher levels of segregation than any other racial/ethnic group – even when taking
into account residential preference and household wealth (Freeman 2000; Crowder et al 2006).
This is due partly to the inability of blacks to translate their individual characteristics (i.e. wealth
and education) into physical proximity to whites (Freeman 2000). The consequence of this
inability has been greater poverty and single parent families, more physical deterioration, poorer
schools, and higher crime rates for black communities (Massey et al 1987; Massey 1990; Massey
and Denton 1993; Krivo et al 1998; Peterson and Krivo 1999; Massey 2001).
Researchers have offered several explanations as to why black communities have been so
affected (see Shihadeh and Flynn 1996 for a detailed overview). Some say segregation works to
undermine the political power of many black communities (Massey and Denton 1993). Others
argue that segregation may weaken attachment to the labor force, which diminishes commitment
to mainstream values and norms (Shihadeh and Flynn 1996). Finally, persistent segregation may
lead to a subcultural adaptation. As Anderson (1994) points out, many inner-city blacks have
adapted to continued segregation by developing the Code of the Streets – which values toughness
and aggression over middle-class goals such as getting a good education and finding gainful
employment. This adaptation works to push inner-city blacks even further away from
mainstream society. Ultimately, physical isolation leads to social isolation.
While previous research on segregation has been helpful in understanding its effects on
black communities, researchers have not examined whether the negative effects of segregation
extend to Latinos, and if they do, are they having the same impact on Latino communities (for
exceptions see Feldmeyer 2010 and Xie 2010). There are several reasons to believe Latinos
might be similarly affected. First, Latinos‟ rates of segregation are almost as high as those of
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blacks (Feldmeyer 2010). Furthermore, Latino segregation has remained fairly stable since
1980, while blacks have experienced a significant decrease (Feldmeyer 2010). Second, Latinos
also tend to have rates of socioeconomic disadvantage similar to those of blacks. Although
Latinos‟ rates of disadvantage are not quite as high as blacks‟, they are still significantly higher
than those of whites – which means segregating Latinos may lead to concentrations of
disadvantage (i.e. concentrated poverty). Finally, as Krivo et al (2009) point out, segregation
increases crime for all races/ethnicities – Latinos and whites included.
Despite the similarities, there is reason to believe Latinos might be differentially affected
by segregation. For instance, Latinos, especially immigrant Latinos, tend to use their social
networks to help them decide where to settle – typically in places where they have friends or
family (Massey 1986; Kasinitz 1992). This suggests that Latinos‟ settlement patterns reflect
voluntary housing choices rather than the forced, discriminatory housing options for blacks
(Charles 2003; Allen and Turner 2009). In fact, as discussed above, Shihadeh and Barranco
(2010c) found that Latino homicide is actually lower when Latinos settle in areas where there is
a substantial Latino population already established. Although the researchers did not test
segregation directly, their work suggests that large concentrations of Latinos (i.e. ethnic
enclaves) might not be negatively affected by their isolation from whites. In fact, they may
actually benefit from it.
Although the link between segregation and Latino violence has recently been examined
in several studies (Burton 2004; Feldmeyer 2010; Xie 2010), these studies suffer from many of
the same methodological issues as the other Latino-crime studies mentioned above (i.e. narrow
geographic scope, not examining Latino homicide, etc.). Furthermore, given the significant role
that immigration plays in many Latino communities, it is surprising that no study has examined
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how segregation and immigration work together to affect rates of Latino violence. It is
imperative that we study both native Latino and immigrant Latino residential isolation.
This study aims to rectify both the methodological issues of past research and the
omission of the effects of immigration-segregation on Latino violence by addressing the
following questions: (1) Are Latino homicide rates affected by segregation? (2) If so, which
types of segregation? (3) Can the difference in Latino homicide victimization found in traditional
and new destinations be explained by segregation?
3.6: Concentration of Poverty and Crime
Physical separation is just one aspect of segregation. The two most commonly used forms
of segregation, unevenness and isolation, measure exactly that – one race/ethnicity‟s physical
separation from another race (typically whites). But segregation can be measured in another
way, namely, by looking at concentrations of groups. The most common measure for this is
concentrated poverty (or disadvantage).
Like segregation, concentrated poverty has mainly been examined in regards to how it
affects blacks. There have been two major theories put forward to explain how blacks have
come to have such high levels of concentrated disadvantage. The first, which points to social
isolation, is based on the work of William Julius Wilson (1987; 1996). Wilson argues that the
movement of good quality, low skill employment out of inner city areas caused the black middleclass to leave these areas in large numbers. With the middle-class gone, so to were the positive
role models, business leaders, and financial resources that once held these communities together.
The residents left behind tended to be overwhelming poor, leaving many inner city
neighborhoods with large concentrations of poor – what Wilson calls ghetto poverty.
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The second theory, put forth by Massey and Denton (1993), argues that segregation from
whites – not middle class blacks – has left blacks with high levels of concentrated poverty. They
argue that practices like white flight and residential steering have left blacks in a
disadvantageous position. For most groups, segregation declines when socioeconomic status
rises. But this is not the case for blacks. Even affluent, segregated black neighborhoods tend to
have many of the same problems as poor, segregated black neighborhoods (Massey and Denton
1993).
Regardless of which theory is correct (see Shihadeh 2009 for a comparison), the fact
remains that blacks have extremely high levels of concentrated poverty. This has had negative
outcomes like the loss of male role models (Parker and Reckdenwald 2008), increased cultural
retaliatory homicide (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003), and more general forms of crime (Krivo and
Peterson 1996; Akins 2009; Eitle 2009). Furthermore, some research suggests that the effect
extends whites (Peterson and Krivo 1999; Lee 2000; Krivo and Peterson 2000)
Though the effects of concentrated poverty on blacks and whites have been extensively
researched, little is known about how Latinos are affected. Given their typically strong social
networks, it is possible that Latinos might be able to overcome living in barrios – segregated
low-income Latino neighborhoods (Jargowsky 2009) - and thrive despite it. Prior research has
been somewhat contradictory. For instance, some research suggests that immigrant
concentrations, even poverty concentrations, can be beneficial by sheltering “newcomers from
the ill-effects that nativist activities may have had on their lives otherwise” (Emeka 2006: 7),
with some going to far as to argue there is a “barrio advantage” (Eschbach et al 2004).
However, recent research by Jargowsky (2009) suggests that not all Latinos benefit from living
in such communities.
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Therefore, my research includes measures of both Latino and immigrant Latino
concentrated disadvantage. In doing so, I am able to address the following questions: (1) Is
segregation in general or concentrated poverty more important in explaining Latino homicide?
(2) Are disadvantaged Latino neighborhoods increasing or decreasing Latino homicide
victimization? (3) Do traditional destinations provide better protection from concentrated
disadvantage than new destinations?
3.7: Methods
I analyze 919 U.S. counties with at least 1,000 Latinos and for which there was racially
disaggregated homicide data available for 2000. As stated above, recent research on
immigration and crime has been too narrow in scope. Therefore, it is important to examine as
broad a spectrum of places as possible. For this reason, I use U.S. counties instead of cities as
my unit of analysis, which allows me to include a significantly larger sample. I include all
counties with 1,000 Latinos for two primary reasons. First, while Latinos tend to be heavily
concentrated in major metropolitan areas, they have had tremendous growth in rural areas (Saenz
and Torres 2003; Lichter and Johnson 2006). By looking at all counties with 1,000 Latinos
(instead of only major urban areas) I hope to capture more of the Latino experience than previous
research. Second, previous research has found that Latinos impact homicide rates in both rural
and urban areas (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Therefore, both areas should be
included in any study examining the effects of Latinos on homicide.
Data for the dependent variable, Latino homicide victimization, were obtained from the
National Vital Statistics System‟s Multiple Cause-of-Death mortality detail file. These data
come from death certificates filed to the Center for Disease Control by local coroners and
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include a wide variety of causes of death, including homicide16. While most prior homicide
research has examined the FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reports or Supplementary Homicide Reports,
neither provides information on Latino offenders or victims17. Vital Statistics, on the other hand,
provides data on Latinos, albeit only victimization data. For this reason, and others, these data
have become more widely used in criminological research (Martinez et al 2008; Loftin,
McDowell and Fetzer 2008; Kposowa, Tsunokai, and McElvain 2006; Wu 2009; Xie 2010;
Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). Furthermore, Martinez et al (2008) note
that while coroner data reflect place of residence, not the place occurrence, for many purposes
they actually provide more accurate and appropriate measures than do the SHR.
In addition to their recent acceptance as a useful data source, I believe these data are
suitable for four reasons. First, since victims and offenders tend to be of similar race/ethnicity
(Boland 1976; O‟Brien 1987; Uniform Crime Reports 2009), it can be reasonably inferred that
victimization data will be similar to offending data, such as the Supplementary Homicide
Reports. In fact, Wiersema et al (2000) found that Supplementary Homicide Reports and Vital
Statistics homicide are highly correlated, especially in places with large populations. Second,
these data do not suffer from missing data problems to the same extent as the Supplementary
Homicide Reports. Third, Arias and Tejada-Vera (2008) find that race and Latino ethnicity
reporting on death certificates is not subject to serious problems of misclassification. Finally,
since death certificates are issued for all deaths, undocumented migrants may also be captured in
these data.

16

Multiple cause-of-death data include 456 different causes of death. Assault (homicide) is coded as number 432
and encapsulates all other homicide subcategories (such as discharge of firearm, strangulation, blunt object, etc.).
17
In 1980 the FBI attempted to add Latinos to SHR forms, but it was so unsuccessful that they abandoned the
attempt by mid-decade (Fox 2005). See Martinez 1996 for an article that attempted to use this data.
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Given this paper‟s focus on homicide differences between traditional and new
destinations, it is important to point out that Latinos in new destinations tend to be younger than
those in traditional destinations. This is seen in new destination‟s lower median age (23.89 vs.
26.48) and greater proportion of Latinos between the ages of 15 and 29 (33% vs. 25%). Since
age has long been linked to homicide, it is possible that any differences found between the two
destinations could be simply due to their age distributions. In order to avoid this possibility, I
calculate age-standardized homicide counts using the age distribution for all U.S. Latinos 18.
These age-standardized victimization counts are used in the following analysis.
Finally, because homicide is a statistically rare event, homicide counts are averaged
over a three-year period (1999, 2000, 2001) to account for year-to-year fluctuations. In terms
of estimating the models, Osgood (2000) and Osgood and Chambers (2000) argue that macrolevel data with a large number of zero observations often follows a Poisson-like distribution,
and thus estimating with OLS is inappropriate. In order to avoid this problem, I follow the
current convention in the literature and use negative binomial regression analysis to predict
the pooled three-year homicide counts. The negative binomial estimator is the appropriate
choice because it allows for overdispersion in the data. Furthermore, following the method of
previous research (Messner et al 2005), the negative binomial estimates control for the spatial
“nesting” of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0.
3.7.2: Independent Variables
The key theoretical concepts in this analysis are immigration and segregation. Since
there have been significant changes in immigration patterns and policy over the past several
decades, I break immigration down into three categories. First, Immigrants Entered Pre-1985
are Latino immigrants who entered before the significant immigration reform of the late 1980s
18

See pages 240-245 in Shryock et al (1976) for a detailed explanation of calculating age-standardized death rates.
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and 1990s. Second, Immigrants Entered 1985-1989 are Latino immigrants who entered
following the passage of IRCA in 1986. Finally, Immigrants Entered 1990-2000 are Latino
immigrants who entered during the period of strict border enforcement and when Latino
immigrants began moving to new destinations.
Segregation, in its many forms, has been shown repeatedly to be positively related to
crime (Messner and South 1986; Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Lee and
Ousey 2005). However, as Massey and Denton (1988) point out, there is no one measure of
segregation. They demonstrate twenty different measures before reducing their list to five key
categories: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. For the current
analysis, I will focus on three types of segregation measures – one evenness and two exposure.
The first measure of segregation I will employ, the index of dissimilarity, falls into
Massey and Denton‟s evenness category. The index of dissimilarity, which is based on the
Lorenz curve, measures the proportion of the minority population that would be required to
move in order to have an even distribution. As it is used in this study, the measure will provide
the proportion of Latinos that must move from areas in which they are overrepresented to areas
in which they are underrepresented. The formula to calculate this is:
D = ∑[ (1/2) |Li – Wi| ] * 100
where Li is the proportion of all Latinos in the county that are located in tract i, while Ni
is the proportion of all whites that are located in tract i. The measure varies between 0 and 100
and is interpreted as the proportion of all Latinos in the county that would need to move in order
to achieve perfect evenness across the city (Latino-White Dissimilarity).

58

The second measure of segregation I will employ, social interaction, falls into Massey
and Denton‟s exposure category. It simply measures the extent to which minority members
(Latinos) are exposed to majority members (Whites). This can be measured as follows:
P* = ∑
where xi, yi, and ti are the number of Latinos, whites, and total population of tract i,
respectively, and X is the total number of Latinos in the county. The measure varies between 0
and 1 – the former representing Latinos‟ complete isolation from whites and the latter
representing full confidence that any given Latino will reside in a tract with a non-Latino
(Latino-White Interaction). Like the Index of Dissimilarity above, Interaction can also be easily
altered to examine segregation between native and immigration Latinos. Therefore I also include
Immigrant-Native Interaction19.
Another exposure measure that gauges segregation is social isolation. This measure,
which is very similar to social interaction, measures the degree to which Latinos are exposed
only to other Latinos. It is measured as follows:
P* = ∑
where xi and ti are the number of Latinos and total population of tract i, respectively, and
X is the total number of Latinos in the county. The measure, like interaction, varies between 0
and 1 – the latter representing Latinos‟ complete isolation from non-Latinos and the former
representing full confidence that any given Latino will reside in a tract with a non-Latino (Latino
Isolation).
Yet another variation of the exposure category of segregation involves examining both
race/ethnicity and poverty – providing a measure of concentrated poverty. For instance, using
19

where xi, yi, and ti are the number of immigrants, natives, and total population of tract i, respectively, and X is the
total number of immigrants in the city.
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the formula given above for social isolation, Latino poverty concentration would be as follows:
xi refers to the number of Latinos in poverty in tracti, X is the total number of Latinos below the
poverty line in the entire county, and ti is the total population of tract i (Poverty Isolation). This
gives the likelihood that a poor Latino will interact with another poor Latino. As with the other
segregation measures, I also construct a measure of poverty concentration for immigrant Latinos
(Immigrant Poverty Isolation20).
3.7.3: Control Variables
Since Latinos tend to dominate low skill employment, I believe it is important to control
for the baseline local labor market conditions. Using the above criteria to identify low skill
industries, I calculate the proportion of all jobs in a city that are considered low skilled (Low skill
Jobs).
Latino Economic Deprivation was obtained by running a principal components factor
analysis with the proportion of Latinos without a high school diploma, the proportion of Latinos
unemployed, the proportion of Latino households headed by a single parent, and the proportion
of all Latinos living in poverty. As measures of social disorganization, I include the proportion
of the population that has moved in the past five years (Moved) and the proportion of all housing
units that are vacant (Vacant Houses). Latinos 15-29 Years Old controls for the age-crime
relationship, while Total Population controls for the size of the county, and Proportion Black
controls for the racial composition. Finally, because high population density may increase the
opportunity for homicide, I include the proportion of housing units that are in clusters of five or
more (Housing Density).

20

xi refers to the number of immigrant Latinos below the poverty line in tract i, X is the total number of immigrant
Latinos below the poverty line in the entire county, and ti is the total population of tracti
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Since the following analysis disaggregates all my models by destination (Tradition vs.
New), it is important to understand how destination is defined. The following method was
developed by combining two methods used by different researchers21. Traditional destinations
are counties whose population comprised at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New Destinations are
defined as counties that experienced at least a 100% increase in their Latino population from
1990 to 200022. If a county fell into both categories, it was labeled as traditional only23.
3.8: Results
Chart 3.3 shows age adjusted and unadjusted Latino homicide victimization rates for the
various definitions of traditional and new destinations. This provides several important findings.
First, regardless of how traditional and new destination is measured, the latter is consistently
higher than the former. In fact, the higher the Latino growth rate, the higher the difference in
rates. Second, the State Method described in Footnote 21 and the 100% County Growth Method
used in this analysis provide nearly identical rates, despite a relatively low correlation (.34, not
reported). Third, due to the relatively youthful Latino population in new destinations (for all
definitions), age adjusting the rates lowers them substantially. In contrast, rates for traditional
areas either increases (County Method) or is not substantially affected (State Method). Despite
this narrowing of the gap, new destinations still have higher rates across the board. By
eliminating age as the primary cause of the difference in victimization rates, the analysis will
now focus on attempting to explain this difference.

21

The first method (State Method), used by Massey and Capoferro (2009) focuses on states. Traditional states are
those containing at least 500,000 Latinos in 1990. New destination states are those that saw a 100% increase in their
Latino population from 1990 to 2000. The second method (County Method), used by Kandel and Cromartie (2004)
focuses on counties. Traditional counties are those whose population contained at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New
destination counties are those that saw a 150% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000.
22
I use 100% to bridge the methods used by Massey and Capoferro (2009) and Kandel and Cromartie (2004). See
footnote 8.
23
Of the 3,141 counties examined, only 31 fall into both categories.
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Chart 3.3: Latino Homicide Victimization Rates by County Definitions, 2000
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The descriptive statistics provided in Table 3.1 illustrate the differences found between
new and traditional destinations. Although both have similar levels of socioeconomic
disadvantage, there are significant differences in demographic makeup, homicide victimization,
and segregation. First, nearly one-third of all new destination Latinos entered the country
between 1990 and 2000 (.30). In traditional areas, only 10% of immigrants entered during the
same period and were just as likely to have entered prior to 1985. In other words, the Latino
population in new destinations is dominated by more recent immigrants, thus demonstrating
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for Latinos in U.S. Counties,
2000
All Counties

Traditional
Destinations
Mean
S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Latino Less than High School#

.46

.17

.51

Latino Unemployment

.05

.03

Latino Single Headed Households

.14

Latino Poverty

New Destinations
Mean

S.D.

.13

.51

.17

.06

.02

.05

.03

.05

.14

.04

.14

.05

.23

.09

.26

.07

.24

.09

Latinos 15-29 Years Old

.29

.07

.25

.04

.33

.06

Immigrants Entered 1990-2000

.19

.15

.10

.08

.30

.14

Immigrants Entered 1985-1989

.05

.03

.04

.03

.07

.03

Immigrants Entered pre1985

.09

.05

.10

.06

.09

.04

16.78

9.04

20.57

9.59

16.27

8.31

Latino-White Interaction

.39

.28

.65

.15

.36

.26

Immigrant-Native Interaction

.16

.20

.45

.21

.10

.10

Latino Isolation

.15

.18

.42

.20

.08

.08

Poverty Isolation

.05

.06

.13

.08

.03

.03

Immigrant Poverty Isolation

.01

.01

.01

.02

.01

.01

Latino Age-Adjusted Homicide
Victimization Rate*
Total Population

5.99

10.98

5.80

7.84

7.28

13.84

Latino-White Dissimilarity

200,137 451,837

260,504

812,951 152,895 205,067

Rural County (Rural=1)

.42

.49

.60

.49

.39

.49

Housing Density

.10

.09

.09

.12

.10

.07

Vacant Houses

.11

.08

.15

.09

.10

.07

Moved

.21

.08

.20

.08

.23

.07

Proportion of Jobs Low skilled

.57

.08

.55

.07

.59

.07

(N=)

919

218

297

# Latino economic deprivation measures (high school, unemployment, single headed households and poverty) are
listed separately for descriptive purposes, but in the multivariate analysis they are combined into a single factor. See
methods section for more detail.
*Homicide is expressed as a rate in the descriptive table, but is entered as counts in the negative binomial regression.
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that new destination Latino communities are much less established than traditional areas24.
Second, as Chart 3.3 showed, even after age adjusting victimization rates, new destinations‟ rates
are 25% higher than traditional areas (7.28 vs. 5.80).
Finally, Table 3.1 also reveals significant differences in segregation between the two
destination areas. First, Latinos in traditional areas are nearly twice as likely to interact with
Whites as Latinos in new destinations (Latino-White Interaction). Second, Immigrant Latinos are
4.5 times more likely to interact with Native Latinos in Traditional areas than Latinos in new
destinations (Immigrant-Native Interaction). Both of these can be explained, at least partially, by
the sheer lack of Latinos in new destinations. Because they are so few in number, they are less
likely to interact with anyone else. Lastly, Latinos are 5 times more likely to interact with other
Latinos in traditional areas than Latinos in new destinations (Latino Isolation). This shows that,
in addition to having small numbers in new destinations, Latinos are also more likely to be
spread out – thus the lower levels of concentration.
Table 3.2 provides the results of three models testing the immigration-crime link in new
destinations by controlling for the proportion of the Latino population that entered the U.S.
during various phases in Latino immigration. Model 1 examines the effects of the most recent
immigrants, those entering between 1990 and 2000. Results show that as the proportion of
Latinos who are recent immigrants increases, so too does Latino homicide victimization (1.76).
To evaluate the strength of the relationship, the coefficients are converted to a proportion25. This
calculation shows that a one standard deviation increase in recent Latino immigration is

24

Of all Latinos living in new destinations, 46% are immigrants, compared to only 24% in traditional areas (not
reported). This means that new destinations are nearly twice as likely house immigrant Latinos.
25
This is done by using the formula (eb*s-1)*100, where b is the coefficient and s is the standard deviation of the
variable in question. In this case, Immigrants Entered 1990-2000.
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Table 3.2: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide
Victimization in 297 New Destination U.S. Counties, 2000
Latino Homicide
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Latinos 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Latino Economic Deprivation
Rural
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000
Immigrants Entered 1985-1989
Immigrants Entered pre1985

-2.42***
(0.53)
-4.92***
(1.69)
4.82†
(2.56)
-3.46
(2.53)
4.03
(2.83)
-3.47
(2.19)
-0.10
(0.13)
-0.06
(0.24)
1.76†
(1.01)
---------

Latino Homicide Latino Homicide
Model 2
Model 3
-2.32***
(0.51)
-4.24**
(1.78)
3.55†
(2.04)
-3.00
(2.87)
6.60***
(1.66)
-1.79
(2.88)
-0.07
(0.11)
0.09
(0.23)
-----3.11
(5.79)
-----

-2.28***
(0.50)
-4.04**
(1.71)
4.21†
(2.56)
-3.19
(2.56)
6.06***
(1.88)
-1.84
(2.66)
-0.11
(0.14)
0.04
(0.22)
---------2.11
(2.55)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0. Latino
Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10

associated with a 27.9% increase in Latino homicide victimization. Models 2 and 3 examine the
effects of immigrants entering immediately after the passage of IRCA (1985-1989) and those
entering before IRCA (pre1985), respectively. In both models immigration has no effect on
victimization, suggesting that only the most recent immigrants - those entering during the period
of strict border enforcement - have any effect on homicide in new destinations.
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Table 3.3 shows the results of models testing the same three immigration variables as
Table 3.2, but for traditional destinations. For all three models, immigration is negatively
associated with Latino homicide victimization. In fact, the effect is just as strong, or stronger,
than the positive effect from the previous table. For the three models, immigration is associated
with a 32.5% (1990-200), 28.2% (1985-1989), and 27.7% (pre1985) decrease in Latino homicide
victimization, respectively. These results, coupled with those of Table 3.2, show that Latino
immigration has very different effects depending on the type of destination. In both cases, the
strongest effects are linked with the most recent immigrants.
The next two tables attempt to answer several empirical questions brought about by the
findings presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. For instance, why do Latino immigrants have such
disparate effects in new and traditional destinations? Is it due to the differences in segregation
demonstrated in Table 3.1? If so, does controlling for segregation explain away the effects of
Latino immigration? And finally, what segregation measures are the most important?
Table 3.4 presents results of models building on the findings of previous research,
namely the positive effects of ethnic enclaves, particularly when it comes to homicide rates (i.e.
Shihadeh and Barranco 2010c). To do this, the level of interaction between Latinos is controlled
for, along with recent immigration. Models 1 and 2 present the negative binomial estimates
when controlling for Latino isolation. This variable measures the degree to which Latinos
interact only with other Latinos. In other words, it measures Latino to Latino interaction, one of
the elements necessary for ethnic enclaves to produce benefits. Since ethnic enclaves, and
therefore Latino interaction, is considered beneficial regardless of location, I expect new and
traditional destinations to be similarly affected by the Latino interaction/isolation measures.
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Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide
Victimization in 218 Traditional Destination U.S. Counties, 2000
Latino Homicide
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Latinos 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Latino Economic Deprivation
Rural
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000
Immigrants Entered 1985-1989
Immigrants Entered pre1985

-0.35***
(0.03)
5.07***
(1.20)
1.39
(1.21)
-2.51***
(0.87)
1.50
(3.13)
-1.33
(1.68)
0.03
(0.10)
1.02***
(0.14)
-3.52***
(1.32)
---------

Latino Homicide Latino Homicide
Model 2
Model 3
-0.32***
(0.03)
4.81***
(1.07)
0.84
(1.14)
-2.54***
(0.86)
1.69
(3.39)
-1.60
(1.65)
0.06
(0.09)
1.07***
(0.12)
-----11.03***
(3.20)
-----

-0.32***
(0.03)
4.65***
(1.12)
1.15
(1.12)
-2.46***
(0.92)
-0.03
(2.71)
-1.19
(1.66)
0.09
(0.07)
1.07***
(0.14)
---------5.40***
(1.22)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0.
Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10
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Latino

Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide
Victimization in Traditional and New Destination U.S. Counties, 2000

Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Latinos 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Latino Economic Deprivation
Rural
Immigrants Entered 19902000
Latino Isolation
Immigrant-Native Interaction
N=

New
Destinations
Model 1

Traditional
Destinations
Model 2

New
Destinations
Model 3

Traditional
Destinations
Model 4

-2.08***
(0.39)
-2.88
(1.89)
4.14**
(2.08)
-1.91
(2.42)
1.23
(2.83)
-0.79
(2.29)
0.11
(0.12)
0.09
(0.24)
1.91**
(0.95)
-5.54***
(1.14)
-----

-0.32***
(0.04)
3.20**
(1.47)
1.27
(1.19)
-2.82***
(0.87)
-4.08
(3.18)
-1.70
(1.44)
0.19**
(0.09)
1.08***
(0.15)
-3.30**
(1.33)
-2.08***
(0.50)
-----

-1.99***
(0.35)
-3.18**
(1.66)
3.85**
(1.96)
-1.76
(2.22)
1.25
(2.63)
-0.99
(2.10)
0.11
(0.11)
0.06
(0.23)
2.08**
(0.89)
-----

-0.32***
(0.05)
3.11†
(1.68)
1.02
(1.07)
-2.84***
(0.87)
-4.67
(3.14)
-1.96
(1.40)
0.19**
(0.09)
0.99***
(0.15)
-3.22**
(1.34)
-----

-4.86***
(0.86)
297

-2.14***
(0.49)
218

297

218

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0.
Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10
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Model 1 shows results for new destinations when controlling for Latino isolation. As the
ethnic enclave literature would predict (but contrary to segregation literature), Latino isolation is
negatively associated with Latino homicide victimization (-5.54), with a 35.8% reduction in
homicide victimization per standard deviation increase. The results of Model 2, which looks at
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traditional destinations, are very similar. Latino isolation is once again negatively associated with
homicide (-2.07) and the percentage reduction in victimization is nearly identical (34%).
As discussed previously in the paper, one of the most important effects of intensified
border enforcement has been the settlement of immigrant Latinos in new areas, particularly areas
with small or no existing Latino population. This lack of contact between immigrants and
natives is one of the key theories behind the disparate Latino homicide rates in new and
traditional destinations. In order to test the validity of this theory, Models 3 and 4 control for the
level of interaction between immigrant and native Latinos, along with the presence of recent
immigrants. Model 3, which focuses on new destinations, finds that increased interaction
between immigrant and native Latinos is associated with lower victimization rates (-4.86).
Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in immigrant-native interaction is results in a 38.5%
decrease in homicide – making it the strongest effect yet. Model 4 controls for the same
variables, but limits the sample to traditional counties. The results are, once again, very similar.
For traditional counties, immigrant-native interaction in a 36.2% reduction in homicide
victimization per standard deviation increase. These results demonstrate the importance of
contact between, not only Latinos in general, but also immigrant and native Latinos. However,
despite the strength of the segregation measures, the effect of recent immigration remains
significant and in the same direction as Tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively, in all four models. See
the Discussion and Conclusion section for a detailed explanation of this finding.
While the previous table found Latino segregation to have positive effects, it remains
unclear if the effect would remain if the Latinos that were segregated were poor. In other words,
what effect does concentrated poverty have on Latino homicide rates? Table 3.5 answers this
question by controlling for Latino, and immigrant Latino, poverty isolation. These measures
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determine the extent to which poor Latinos interact only with other poor Latinos. Models 1 and
2 control for Latino poverty isolation in new and traditional destinations, respectively. In both
models concentrated poverty actually works to lower Latino homicide victimization rates

Table 3.5: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide
Victimization in Traditional and New Destination U.S. Counties, 2000

Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Latinos 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Latino Economic Deprivation
Rural
Immigrants Entered 19902000
Latino Poverty Isolation
Immigrant Poverty Isolation
N=

New
Destinations
Model 1

Traditional
Destinations
Model 2

New
Destinations
Model 3

Traditional
Destinations
Model 4

-2.01***
(0.38)
-4.04**
(1.70)
3.88**
(1.89)
-3.16
(2.14)
2.11
(2.54)
-2.28
(2.24)
0.18
(0.12)
-0.06
(0.23)
1.83**
(0.94)
-12.33***
(3.48)
-----

-3.16***
(0.04)
3.44**
(1.48)
1.57
(1.29)
-3.04***
(0.94)
-4.10
(2.96)
-2.49†
(1.37)
0.39**
(0.10)
1.00***
(0.18)
-3.25**
(1.33)
-5.70***
(0.79)
-----

-2.35***
(0.44)
-4.29***
(1.61)
5.93**
(2.39)
-2.99
(2.06)
3.16
(2.59)
-2.89
(2.02)
0.11
(0.12)
-0.05
(0.24)
2.67***
(1.04)
-----

-0.33***
(0.04)
4.51***
(1.31)
1.98
(1.33)
-3.10***
(0.90)
-2.80
(2.75)
-1.90
(1.50)
0.30***
(0.09)
0.95***
(0.15)
-1.50
(1.41)
-----

-49.62***
(7.94)
297

-18.96***
(3.03)
218

297

218

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0.
Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10
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(-12.33, -5.70). This is also the case in Models 3 and 4 which control for immigrant
concentrated poverty (-49.62, -18.96) – showing that it does not matter if native or foreign-born
Latinos are living in areas of concentrated poverty, Latinos stand to benefit either way. These
results seemingly confirm that there is, in fact, a barrio advantage. As mentioned previously,
some researchers found that poor Latino neighborhoods, barrios, provide certain protections to
newcomers – essentially keeping them out of trouble (Emeka 2006). In other works, the
beneficial effects of ethnic enclaves extend even to neighborhoods that are extremely poor. In
sum, it appears that contact between Latinos, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the
contact, is beneficial to the community.
Table 3.6 presents several auxiliary models which are designed to ensure the effect of the
isolation and interaction measures on Latino victimization will not be accounted for by other
potentially important segregation measures. Since most segregation indices measure segregation
of some minority group from whites, controlling for this could potentially dampen, or remove
altogether, the effects of the previously used isolation and interaction measures. Therefore, both
Latino-White interaction and Latino-White dissimilarity are controlled for in the following table.
All models were run separately for new and traditional destinations, with coefficients and
standard deviations presented for both. Models 1 and 2 test the significance of Latino isolation,
Models 3 and 4 examine immigrant-native interaction, Models 5 and 6 test Latino poverty
isolation, and finally, Models 7 and 8 examine immigrant poverty isolation. In all eight models,
for both new and traditional destinations, segregation from whites does not remove the effects of
the isolation and interaction measures26. In fact, all but one remains significant at the .01 level
(Model 6 for New Destinations, -10.56). This once again confirms the fact that interaction

26

Segregation from whites was significant in only 3 out of the 16 models. These include: New Destinations - Model
5 and Model 7, Traditional Destinations – Model 7.

71

between Latinos remains one of the most important factors in explaining their homicide
victimization rates.

Table 3.6: Coefficients and Standard Deviations for Segregation Variables Predicting
Latino Homicide Victimization under Alternative Model Specifications in 297 New
Destination and 218 Traditional Destination U.S. Counties, 2000
New
Traditional
Destinations
Destinations
Latino Isolation
Model 1: controlling for Latino-White Interaction
Model 2: controlling for Latino-White Dissimilarity

-4.20***
(1.22)
-7.54***
(1.75)

-2.21***
(0.36)
-2.08***
(0.46)

-3.90***
(1.01)
-6.26***
(1.18)

-2.28***
(0.34)
-2.09***
(0.46)

-9.71***
(3.63)
-10.56**
(4.61)

-6.63***
(0.42)
-5.76***
(0.84)

-39.54***
(10.51)
-44.54***
(8.03)

-22.24***
(4.16)
-17.84***
(5.22)

Immigrant-Native Interaction
Model 3: controlling for Latino-White Interaction
Model 4: controlling for Latino-White Dissimilarity
Latino Poverty Isolation
Model 5: controlling for Latino-White Interaction
Model 6: controlling for Latino-White Dissimilarity
Immigrant Poverty Isolation
Model 7: controlling for Latino-White Interaction
Model 8: controlling for Latino-White Dissimilarity

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0.
Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10
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3.9: Discussion and Conclusion
Since the mid-1980s, the pattern of settlement by Latino migrants has changed
dramatically. These migrants are now settling in parts of the United States that have never before
had significant Latino populations. This has led many to fear that their arrival will spark an
increase in crime. Unfortunately, early explanations of immigration and crime focused on the
experience of Eastern European immigrants. Therefore, it is not clear whether the experience of
Latino immigrants could be explained in the same way – especially with some researchers
finding that immigrants now lower crime rates. However, most recent research on immigration
has failed to analyze any of the new areas of settlement. Furthermore, new settlement patterns
raise the risk of Latinos becoming increasingly segregated from whites, and, in places with small
Latino populations, also from Latinos. Given the substantial amount of research demonstrating
the negative effects of segregation, Latinos in new destinations run the risk of being exposed to
high levels of violence. This study attempts to rectify the shortcomings of previous research by
examining the effects of immigration and segregation in both traditional and new destinations.
I observe the following findings: (1) Latino homicide victimization and segregation, on
average, is higher in new destination than traditional counties. (2) The relationship between
recent Latino immigration and homicide victimization is positive in new destinations, but
negative in traditional counties. (3) Interaction between Latinos in general, and immigrant and
native Latinos specifically, lowers Latino homicide rates in both traditional and new destinations.
(4) This interaction remains beneficial even when the Latinos are poor. (5) These interactions
remain significant even when controlling for Latinos‟ segregation from whites. I draw several
implications from these findings.
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First, the results of this study demonstrate the importance of disaggregating homicide
models by immigrant destination when examining the effects of Latino immigration. As
discussed previously, prior research examining the effects of immigration on homicide have
focused on areas that have traditionally housed large immigrant population. The fact that this
research has found immigration to have no effect on homicide, nor does it lower it, is not
surprising given the prevalence of ethnic enclaves in these areas. By ignoring new destinations,
however, prior research assumes that the experience, and effect, of immigrants is consistent
across all community types. The results of this study put that assumption in doubt. It appears that
non-traditional destinations are not able to offset the potentially negative effects of an influx of
recent immigrants.
Second, this analysis shows, that interaction between Latinos is beneficial regardless of
location. This finding generally supports the narrative in the ethnic enclave literature.
Interactions help foster social networks, which disseminate useful information to community
members – such as what jobs to look for, what wages to ask for, and where to find employment
(Fernandez-Kelley 1995; Aguilera 1999; Aguilera and Massey 2003). Furthermore, this benefit
is conferred even on communities that are poor.
Third, segregation from whites may be harmful to blacks, but it does not appear to affect
Latinos. This goes back to the main question raised by the Latino paradox – how can Latinos
endure economic and social hardships nearly on par with blacks and not experience the same
levels of negative outcomes, such as crime? When it comes to segregation from whites, the
answer may lie in an ever-changing “color-line”. As Bean et al (2009) argue, the white/nonwhite color line has now become a black/non-black color line, with Asians and Latinos
becoming more widely accepted into the “white” category. This has importance consequences
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for Latino- and black-white segregation. For blacks, the separation is clear – there is black and
there is white. Either they are integrated or segregated. For Latinos, it is much less clear. How
can Latinos be truly segregated from a group in which they are continually gaining membership?
The lines become blurred, thereby confusing the effect of segregation.
Fourth, like segregation, Latinos seem to be differentially affected by concentrated
poverty. In this analysis, Latinos actually benefit from concentrated poverty. This is in stark
contrast to its effects on blacks, which is nearly universally found to be negative. One of the
main reasons for this negative effect on blacks is the loss of ties to mainstream institutions.
Blacks living in poor neighborhoods are unable, for various reasons, to acquire both the skills
and information necessary to obtain gainful employment. This persistent joblessness leads many
blacks to lose touch with mainstream norms and can often lead to the development of a
subculture – many of which value toughness and violence (Anderson 1994). Latinos, however,
do not experience the same levels of joblessness as blacks. Latinos in general tend to make less
money than white or blacks. But, Latinos have much higher levels of employment than blacks,
thus resulting in a large number of “working poor” Latinos. This means that despite living in
poverty, and/or impoverished neighborhoods, Latinos maintain their ties to mainstream society
through relatively high levels of employment. This may be one explanation for the different
effect concentrated poverty has on blacks and Latinos.
Finally, despite all this, recent immigrants continue to increase homicide in new
destinations. As outlined previously in the paper, the most popular explanation for the positive
relationship between immigration and crime is Social Disorganization Theory. Although the
idea that the influx of immigrants into a community hinders its ability to regulate itself was
developed to explain the effect of Eastern European immigrants nearly a century, it still appears
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to hold some relevance today. This explanation may very well explain why Latino crime rates are
higher in new destinations - but it clearly does not hold up in traditional areas. Assuming Social
Disorganization Theory does explain the positive relationship between immigration and crime,
the question remains – why are immigrants not disorganizing communities in traditional
destinations?
One explanation, discussed previously, points to the lack of benefits provided by ethnic
communities. The idea is that traditional areas are not affected by immigration because their
Latino populations have been established for a decade or more and have developed highly
intricate social networks and the institutions necessary for community success. With these
networks and institutions in place, immigrants are effortlessly absorbed into the community.
New destinations, in contrast, lack these beneficial elements and are therefore unable to help
newly arrived migrants adjust to community life – with one consequence being increased
homicide victimization in the community.
But this explanation still does not explain why only the most recent immigrants are
associated with increased levels of violence in new destinations – even when controlling for
Latino-Latino interaction. If the lack of community institutions and social networks explain the
increase in violence, why do immigrants entering prior to 1990 not have a similar effect? Perhaps
it is not only the destination of the migrants that explains their impact on violence, but also their
origin. By studying where the migrants are coming from in Mexico, and perhaps detecting
changes in these emigration patterns, researchers may be able to explain why recent immigrants
are raising homicide rates in new destinations.
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A preliminary analysis of data from the Mexican Migration Project 27 and Mexican
homicide data28 does, in fact, show a shift in Mexican emigration patterns. First, all thirty two
Mexican states were ranked according to their homicide rates during the years 1990-1994. The
top sixteen were identified and labeled as “Violent States”.
According to the data, there was a shift in where the migrants were coming from in
Mexico. For instance, prior to 1985, 34.7% of all interviewed migrants were born in Violent
States. After 1990, this number jumps to 40%. Furthermore, the MMP also provides important
information about where migrants from Violent States settled. Of all the migrants interviewed
who settled in traditional destinations, 40.6% came from Violent States. In contrast, 44.2% of
migrants settling in new destinations were born in a Violent State.
These differences, though slight, may provide some insight into why the effect of recent
immigrants into new destinations cannot be explained away by Latino interaction. One can posit
that, once the emigration patterns in Mexico shifted more to Violent States, new destinations
were not able to handle these newcomers given their lack of established Latino communities–
thus leading to higher homicide victimization. This is not to say, however, that these recent
migrants are more violent than their predecessors and are committing more crimes. Given the
violence in their home states, these immigrants are exposed to more violence than those who
came before them. It is possible that they are more accepting of violence or perhaps less
sensitive to it. If this is the case, they will be much less likely to intervene when they see

27

The MMP is a survey of Mexican immigrants about their migration experiences. It was started in 1982 by Jorge
Durand and Douglas S. Massey and includes over 7,000 interviews. See http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/home-en.aspx
for more information.
28
Data were obtained from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografica (INEGI) and the Consejo Nacional de
Poblacion (CONAPO). INEGI and CONAPO are Mexican government agencies charged with collecting official
statistics. Homicide data were obtained from INEGI and population data were obtained from CONAPO.
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something bad happening in their new community. This, according to Social Disorganization
Theory, is one of the strongest predictors of community violence.
This analysis is in no way exhaustive. Hopefully it presents just as many questions as
answers. It is up to future researchers to determine whether this is the best explanation for the
effect recent immigrants have in new destinations. Regardless of the reason, it remains to be
seen whether this pattern continues. Drug wars in Mexico near the end of the 2000s may change
emigration patterns again, or it might completely change the Mexican states which are
considered “Violent”. Furthermore, future research must determine how long it takes a
community to become a “traditional destination”. After 10-15 years of Latinos settling in new
destinations, will those communities be considered traditional by 2010? Or does the process take
longer than that? With 10-15 years of establishing social networks and the institutions necessary
for a community to be successful, will the homicide rates in new destinations decline by 2010?
These are just a few of the questions researchers should strive to answer in the near future.
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CHAPTER 4: LATINOS, BLACKS, AND THE COMPETITION FOR LOW-SKILL
JOBS – EXAMINING REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN THE EFFECT OF
IMMIGRATION ON LOW-SKILL EMPLOYMENT

4.1: Introduction
The economic and cultural deprivation of blacks is a subject that gained a significant
amount of attention in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The most famous study to come out of
this period was Wilson‟s (1987) The Truly Disadvantaged. It claimed that in the 1970s, wage
polarization and out-migration combined to concentrate poverty in inner-cities. Those impacted
most by these changes were inner-city blacks. This has led to what Wilson (1991) calls “the
underclass, whose primary predicament is joblessness.” The poverty and joblessness caused by
the deprivation of blacks has been shown to lead to an increase in black crime rates, especially
when there is a lack of low skill jobs (Lee and Shihadeh 1998; Shihadeh and Ousey 1998; Parker
and McCall 1999; Weiss and Reid 2005). In addition to poverty, unemployment, and a lack of
low-skilled jobs, segregation and female-headed households are also often cited as being
predictors of black violent crime. With all of these structural impediments bearing down on
blacks, there may be a new challenge looming - the effect of Latino competition for low-skilled
jobs.
Following the 2000 Census, Latinos overtook blacks as the largest minority group in the
United States. This population shift was fueled, at least in part, by a disruption in the circular
nature of Mexican immigration to the United States. For instance, increased border enforcement
in the mid-1990s caused many migrants to not only settle outside of traditional migrant
destinations, but also remain in the United States for longer periods of time. The result was a
dramatic increase in the number of Latinos residing the United States.
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While there have been numerous studies analyzing the impact of Latino immigration on
the United States‟ economy (Auerbach and Oreopoulos 1999; Borjas 1994; Borjas and Tienda
1987, to name only a few), only a handful have focused specifically on its impact on blacks
(Hamermesh and Bean 1998; Shulman 2004), and only one has looked at its impact on black
crime rates (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a). This is a significant omission since the influx of
Latino immigrants may increase competition for low skill jobs, thereby increasing black rates of
crime.
There are several reasons to expect Latinos to successfully compete for low skill jobs.
First, more Latino business owners (Light and Gold 2000) means more job opportunities since
employers are more likely to hire workers of the same race/ethnicity (Bailey 1987; Hansen and
Cardenas 1988). Second, Latinos typically work for lower wages – sometimes as much as $4,000
less per year than blacks (U.S. Census Bureau-Current Population Survey 2002). Third, many
employers have stereotypically good opinions of Latinos, and bad opinions of black workers
(Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Waldinger 1997; Johnson-Webb 2002) – leading to hiring
discrimination by race/ethnicity. Finally, Latino immigrants tend to use their strong social
networks to help them find employment (Fernandez-Kelley 1995; Aguilera 1999; Aguilera and
Massey 2003) – often obtaining information about a job before it is available (Greico 1987). For
these reasons, it is easy to see how Latinos might potentially make obtaining low skill
employment more difficult for blacks – thereby increasing their economic deprivation and
homicide rates.
Therefore, this paper attempts to further understanding of how Latinos and Latino
immigration affect black homicide rates via low-skill employment, by building upon the work of
Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a). This analysis improves upon their work in three important
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ways. First, by using counties instead of cities, I am able to expand the sample size and include
both rural and urban areas – which allow multiple studies to be replicated at the same time (see
Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Second, I examine new and traditional destinations
separately. Since many Latinos have been drawn to new destinations by the lure of low skill
employment, it is possible that they may be more concentrated in low skill industries – which
can have detrimental effects on blacks. Finally, I test the robustness of any low-skill employment
effects by controlling for potentially important segregation measures.
4.2: Industrial Restructuring and Segregation
The 1970s should have been an advantageous decade for blacks. The Civil Rights Acts
of 1964 and 1968 were designed to protect, among others, blacks from discrimination in all
facets of life, including housing. This meant that blacks should have been able to work and live
wherever they wanted without worrying about racial discrimination. As Wilson (1987) points
out, many working and middle class blacks benefitted not only from these legal changes, but also
from the expanding public sector of the economy. However, not everyone in the black
community was so fortunate. Many inner city blacks had their social mobility limited by the
industrial restructuring that took place in the 1970s (Kasarda 1993).
According to Kasarda (1993), the low-skilled jobs that inner city blacks depended on for
their social mobility were moved to the suburbs and were subsequently replaced by white collar
jobs requiring higher levels of education. Many middle class blacks adjusted to this change; they
simply moved out of the inner city into the suburbs. This mass exodus of middle class blacks
effectively bifurcated the black community - leaving only those too poor to move concentrated in
the center of many metropolitan areas (Wilson 1987). Many blacks were stuck in inner cities
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with limited job opportunities and no way of leaving what Wilson (1987) calls “ghetto poverty”
areas.
While Kasarda and Wilson seem to agree that industrial restructuring has caused the
persistent poverty of blacks, Massey and Denton (1993) believe residential segregation to be the
main factor. They argue that residential segregation has had similar effects as industrial
restructuring. Many blacks are forced to live in a “social environment where poverty and
joblessness are the norm, where a majority of children are born out of wedlock, where most
families are on welfare, where educational failure prevails, and where social and physical
deterioration abound” (pg. 2). The longer blacks are forced to live in these conditions, the less
likely it is that they will be able to get out.
Regardless of the reason, the fact remains – inner city blacks have been living in areas of
extreme poverty and have very limited means with which to improve their conditions. These
conditions have had many detrimental effects on blacks, one of which has been an increase in
black violent crime rates. While this impressive body of research is instructive as to structural
impediments faced by blacks, there is another impediment which may be looming: Latino
immigration and the competition for low-skilled jobs
4.3: Latino Immigration and Labor Competition
The 2000 Census saw Latinos overtake blacks as the largest minority group in the United
States. Latino growth has been propelled not only by a higher birth rate than all other
racial/ethnic groups (Dye 2005; Johnson and Lichter 2008), but also by a steady flow of
immigrants. From 1990 to 2000, the number of Mexican immigrants in the United States
increased from 4,298,000 to 7,841,000 (U.S. Census Bureau-Census Brief 2002). Part of the
reason for this increase was a disruption in the circular nature of Latino immigration. In the past,
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migrants came to the United States temporarily in order to earn enough wages to fund a project
back home, such as a car, a house, or a business (Durand and Massey 2006). This circular
process was disrupted during the early 1990s by a new border enforcement policy that became
known as “prevention through deterrence” (Massey and Capoferro 2009). In 1993, Operation
Blockade was launched in El Paso, Texas and Operation Gatekeeper the following year in San
Diego, California. Both Operations sought to prevent border crossings through militarization
and fence building. As a result, border crossings at El Paso and San Diego were virtually
eliminated (Nevins 2002), making entry into the United States and Mexico more difficult.
With the militarization of the border shutting off traditional entry points, migrants began
moving to new parts of the United States, transforming immigration from a regional to a national
phenomenon. Furthermore, the militarization also caused more migrants begin to settle
permanently in the United States rather than risk not being able to return at some future date.
This, coupled with the three million immigrants naturalized with the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act in 1986, has led to a dramatic increase in the U.S. Latino population.
Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has more than tripled from 14.5
million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008)
The characteristics of these immigrants and the Latino population in general suggest that
they would have a significant effect on the labor market outcomes of low skilled black native
workers. Only 57% of Latinos 25 and older have a high school diploma, compared to 80% of
blacks (Stoops 2004). Between 2004 and 2005, Latinos without a high school diploma gained
258,000 more jobs than blacks of the same description (U.S. Census Bureau-Current Population
Survey 2005). Also, Latinos have lower unemployment rates than blacks (U.S. Census Bureau-
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Current Population Survey 2006) and a higher labor force participation rate – no matter what
variables are controlled for (Aponte 1996).
The fact that both blacks and Latinos (especially Latino immigrants) rely heavily on low
skilled jobs suggest there would be labor market competition between the two groups (Briggs Jr.
2003). While some would argue that immigrants take jobs that natives do not want, there has
been no evidence to support such a claim (Hammermesh 1998). In fact, there has been evidence
of exactly the opposite. Several studies have found that blacks in particular are negatively
affected by immigration (Borjas 1998; Reimers 1998). Johannsson and Shulman (2004) found
that immigration causes natives (especially native blacks) to drop out of the labor force – for this
reason they believe unemployment is not an accurate measure of the negative impacts of
immigration on natives. According to Johannsson and Shulman (2004), “it is implausible to
think that [immigration‟s] effects on native workers are negligible.” I believe there are four
competitive advantages that Latinos have when competing with blacks for low-skilled jobs:
higher ethnic entrepreneurship, lower reserve wages, stereotypical views of both Latino and
black workers, and stronger social networks.
Latino immigrants have a distinct advantage in getting hired over blacks because there
are more successful Latino entrepreneurs (Bailey 1987; Light and Gold 2000). This is important
because research has found that ethnic employers are much more likely to hire workers of the
same ethnicity for their businesses (Bailey 1987; Hansen and Cardenas 1988). Consider the
following: in 2002 there were 199,725 Latino owned businesses employing 1,546,092 people,
compared to only 94,862 black owned businesses employing just 770,746 people (U.S. Census
Bureau-Survey of Business Owners 2002). This means that Latinos have twice as many
opportunities to find a job with a business owner of the same race/ethnicity than blacks do.
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Furthermore, it has been shown that in large cities just having a significant number of selfemployed Mexican immigrants helps the economic conditions of non-self-employed Mexican
immigrants (Spener and Bean 1999).
However, not all immigrants find employment with immigrant-owned businesses. They
compete more with low-skilled blacks when they are looking for jobs with non-immigrant owned
businesses. One major advantage that Latinos have over blacks is that they work for lower
wages (Waters 1995; Wilson 1996), nearly $4,000 less per year than blacks (U.S. CensusCurrent Population Survey 2002). Not only do Latinos work for lower wages, but their wages
have actually gone down since the passage of IRCA in 1986 (Cobb-Clark, Shiells, and Lowell
1995; Fry, Lowell, and Haghighat 1995). According to the U.S. Census Bureau‟s Current
Population Survey (2002), the period from 1986 to 2002 saw weekly wage increases (in constant
2002 dollars) for both white ($579 to $624) and black ($456 to $498) workers, but a decline for
Latinos ($434 to $423). Evidence also shows that this decrease for Latinos and increase for
whites and blacks has continued past 2002 (Kochhar 2005). These lower wages, in turn, lead to
a lower overhead cost for the employers – thus increasing the incentive to hire Latino workers.
Latinos are also more likely to be hired over blacks because of the stereotypical views
held by employers. Research done across various regions of the nation (South – Johnson-Webb
2002; East – Kim 1999; North – Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; West – Yoon 1997) has
studied why Latino workers are preferred over native non-Latino workers. Research has shown
that many employers have a negative view of black workers, leading to hiring discrimination by
race (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996; Min 1996; Yoon 1997;
Kim 1999). Even when blacks are hired, it is immigrant blacks, such as Caribbean or West
African, rather than native blacks that are hired (Lee 1998; Newman 1999). Research has also
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shown that employers believe native blacks are less willing to take menial positions in the
business (Yoon 1997). Many employers believe that Mexicans have a superior work ethic
(Waldinger 1997; Johnson-Webb 2002) and, as noted earlier, will work for lower wages. These
stereotypical views are even more pronounced in immigrant and ethnic business owners.
Latino immigrants have another distinct advantage over blacks because they use their
strong social networks help them to find jobs (Fernandez-Kelley 1995; Aguilera 1999; Aguilera
and Massey 2003). Aguilera and Massey (2003) point out that “friends and relatives may assist
migrants by providing them with useful information: where to look for jobs, what wages to ask
for, and which sorts of jobs and worksites to avoid” (pg. 674). Many employers rely on their
current immigrant employees to assist them in hiring new employees (Bogen 1987; Waldinger
1997; Kim 1999; Light and Gold 2000; Johnson-Webb 2002) – this is especially true for Latinos
(Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991) and Mexican immigrants (Waldinger 1982; Bailey 1987;
Massey 1987). Likewise, immigrants‟ social networks often provide them with information on
job openings before they are advertised (Greico 1987). While social ties are important for lowerclass blacks, these social ties are weaker among working blacks (Stack 1974). Blacks often face
more barriers when using personal contacts (Holzer 1987), which may be the reason they are
more likely to use formal agencies to find employment (Osterman 1980; Charner and Fraser
1984). Therefore, immigrants will not only know where to look for jobs, but they will be better
prepared to get the job as well.
If Latinos are successful in landing low-skill jobs, they may push blacks out in some
instances. This may lead to an increase in unemployment, a decrease in labor force participation
and wages – all of which leads to increased levels of poverty.
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4.4: Economic Deprivation and Crime
Poverty is one of the oldest explanations of crime. Although most studies have found a
positive relationship between poverty and crime (Decker 1980; Bailey 1984; Williams 1984;
Loftin and Parker 1985; Patterson 1991), some research has found the opposite (Blau and Blau
1982; Crutchfield, Geerken, and Gove 1982; Messner 1983). The discrepancy in findings may
be due to the fact that the relationship between poverty and crime depends on what crimes you
are analyzing (Crutchfield, Geerken, and Gove 1982; Patterson 1991).
The findings pertaining to the relationship between unemployment and crime are similar
to those for poverty and crime. Many studies have found a positive relationship between the two
(Sampson 1987; Smith, Devine and Shelley 1992; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994; Shihadeh
and Flynn 1996), others have found the opposite (Sampson 1985). Chiricos (1987) attempted to
settle the dispute by reviewing 63 studies on the subject. He found that the majority of crosssectional aggregate studies found a positive relationship between unemployment and crime.
Several studies have shown that black violent crime rates can be attributed to blacks‟
residential segregation from whites (Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996).
Neighborhoods with a high concentration of blacks have social environments of poorer quality
for its residents than neighborhoods composed mostly of whites. This segregation may cause
urban blacks to become isolated from mainstream society and lose contact with the institutions
necessary for upward social and economic mobility (Shihadeh and Flynn 1996).
Research has also shown that a lack of low-skilled jobs increases violent crime rates in
urban areas. A decline in access to low-skilled jobs increases violent crime rates indirectly by
first raising economic deprivation (Lee and Shihadeh 1998; Shihadeh and Ousey 1998). While
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this decline in low-skilled jobs may decrease black intra-racial violent crime, it has a significant
positive effect on black interracial violent crime (Parker and McCall 1999).
Researchers examining the link between deprivation and crime often follow one of two
theoretical pathways. First, there is the micro-level approach, which is based heavily on
Merton‟s (1938) strain theory. This theory states that deprivation causes individuals to become
frustrated and less connected with society. It is believed that this creates a criminally motivated
offender who must resort to crime in order to survive (Cantor and Land 1985; Land et al 1994).
However, this approach has not received much support empirically (Sampson and Wilson 1995),
due, at least in part, to government assistance programs like welfare (Allan and Steffensmeier
1989).
But there is a second, macro-level approach which is based on the work of Shaw and
McKay (1942) and Social Disorganization Theory. This theory states that when a neighborhood
has low socioeconomic status, high residential instability, and racial heterogeneity (Land,
McCall, and Cohen 1990; Bursik 1999), formal and informal ties are not formed among
residents, which limit the residents‟ ability to reach common goals (Land, McCall, and Cohen
1990; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Bellair 1997; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Barnett and
Mencken 2002), such as stopping neighborhood crime. Furthermore, continued economic
deprivation can lead individuals to become detached from conventional norms and work to stop
communities from developing ties with mainstream institutions (Shihadeh and Steffensmeier
1994; Messner 1988). An individual‟s ability to obtain, and hold on to, a job helps to prevent
these things from occurring.
There are some researchers who believe it is not necessary to choose one theory over the
other. However, flaws have also been found in theories that attempt to find a common ground
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between these micro- and macro-level explanations. Perhaps the most prominent work to
combine micro and macro explanations was Blau and Blau‟s (1982) study of inequality. They
found that in areas where there were high levels of inequality (both intra-racial and interracial),
individuals felt anger and frustration – which then led to higher crime rates. Their argument, put
simply, was that macro-level phenomena can simply be explained as a collection of individuallevel processes. But, as Shihadeh and Ousey (1998: 190) point out, “[such thinking] makes it
impossible to distinguish between individual and aggregate social processes. If macro-level
studies fail to make that distinction, it begs the larger question – why examine this relationship at
the aggregate level?”
There has been one study that has examined the effects of the competition for low-skill
jobs between Latinos and blacks. Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a) found that black homicide
rates in a sample of 143 cities were higher in places where Latinos gained ground in low-skill
employment. However, their study can be improved upon in several ways. First, by using
counties instead of cities, I am able to expand the sample size and include both rural and urban
areas – which allow multiple studies to be replicated at the same time (see Shihadeh and
Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Most importantly, I examine new and traditional destinations
separately. Since many Latinos have been drawn to new destinations by the lure of low skill
employment, it is possible that they may be more concentrated in low skill industries – which
can have detrimental effects on blacks. Furthermore, they are being recruited by employers,
which by definition means they are looking to hire someone outside the local labor pool - lowskilled blacks, for instance. Therefore, it is important to examine regional differences in
Latino/black low-skill employment.

89

4.5: Methods
I analyze 803 U.S. counties with at least 1,000 blacks, 1,000 Latinos, and for which there
was racially disaggregated homicide data available for 2000. As stated above, Latinos have
begun to settle across the United States. Therefore, it is important to examine as broad a
spectrum of places as possible. For this reason, I use U.S. counties instead of cities as my unit of
analysis, which allows me to include a significantly larger sample. I include all counties with
1,000 blacks and Latinos for two primary reasons. First, while Latinos tend to be heavily
concentrated in major metropolitan areas, they have had tremendous growth in rural areas (Saenz
and Torres 2003; Lichter and Johnson 2006). By looking at all counties with 1,000 blacks and
Latinos (instead of only major urban areas) I hope to capture competition for low skill jobs in
both rural and urban areas. Second, previous research has found that Latinos impact homicide
rates in both rural and urban areas (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Therefore, both areas
should be included in any study examining the effects of Latinos on homicide.
Data for the dependent variable, black homicide victimization, were obtained from the
National Vital Statistics System‟s Multiple Cause-of-Death mortality detail file. These data
come from death certificates filed to the Center for Disease Control by local coroners and
include a wide variety of causes of death, including homicide29. While most prior homicide
research has examined the FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) or Supplementary Homicide
Reports (SHR), Vital Statistics data have become more widely used in criminological research
(Martinez, Stowell, and Cancino 2008; Loftin, McDowell and Fetzer 2008; Kposowa, Tsunokai,
and McElvain 2006; Wu 2009; Xie 2010; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d).

29

Multiple cause-of-death data include 456 different causes of death. Assault (homicide) is coded as number 432
and encapsulates all other homicide subcategories (such as discharge of firearm, strangulation, blunt object, etc.).
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These data are more suitable than other forms of data for several reasons. First, Martinez,
Stowell, and Cancino (2008) note that while coroner data reflect place of residence, not the place
occurrence, for many purposes they actually provide more accurate and appropriate measures
than do the SHR. Second, these data do not suffer from missing data problems to the same
extent as the Supplementary Homicide Reports. Furthermore, since victims and offenders tend
to be of similar race/ethnicity (Boland 1976; O‟Brien 1987; Uniform Crime Reports 2009), it can
be reasonably inferred that victimization data will be similar to offending data, such as the
Supplementary Homicide Reports. In fact, Wiersema et al (2000) found that Supplementary
Homicide Reports and Vital Statistics homicide are highly correlated, especially in places with
large populations.
Because homicide is a statistically rare event, homicide counts are averaged over a threeyear period (1999, 2000, 2001) to account for year-to-year fluctuations. In terms of
estimating the models, Osgood (2000) and Osgood and Chambers (2000) argue that macrolevel data with a large number of zero observations often follows a Poisson-like distribution,
and thus estimating with OLS is inappropriate. In order to avoid this problem, I follow the
current convention in the literature and use negative binomial regression analysis to predict
the pooled three-year homicide counts. The negative binomial estimator is the appropriate
choice because it allows for overdispersion in the data. Furthermore, following the method of
previous research (Messner et al 2005), the negative binomial estimates control for the spatial
“nesting” of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0.
4.5.1: Independent Variables
In order to control for labor market competition between Latinos and Blacks, I include a
low-skill composition variable. I use the Career Guide to Industries (CGI) of the U.S. Bureau
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of Labor Statistics (2006) to crosstabulate industrial sectors with the mean years of educational
attainment. Low skill industries are those where more than 50% of the individuals (age 25 and
over) working in that sector lack a high-school diploma. The resulting nine sectors are:
[Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing], [Mining], [Construction], [Manufacturing],
[Transportation], [Retail Trade], [Accommodation and food services], [Other services], and
[Waste Management]. This is close to Kasarda‟s (1993) classification, who likewise finds that
education comes close to operationalizing the concept (see also Bound and Freeman 1990; Moss
and Tilly 1991). Using the low skill industries identified above, I compute a simple log-odds
measure comparing the odds of Latinos being in low skill jobs to the odds of Blacks being in low
skill jobs (Low skill Composition). This can be seen as:
[(LLS x BNLS) / (LNLS x BLS)] lne
where LLS is the number of Latinos in low skill jobs, BNLS is the number of blacks not in low
skill jobs, LNLS is the number of Latinos not in low skill jobs, and BLS is the number of blacks
in low skill jobs. Values above zero would suggest that the proportion of Latinos employed in
low skill jobs is greater than that of blacks. Values below zero would be the exact opposite.
Finally, following Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a), I examine inter-industry differences
by creating four industry specific low skill composition measures. The four measures are for:
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (Agriculture Composition); Manufacturing and Construction
(Manufacturing/Construction Composition); Service (Service Composition); and all remaining
industries (Other Composition).
4.5.2: Control Variables
Since Latinos tend to dominate low skill employment, I believe it is important to control
for the baseline local labor market conditions. Using the above criteria to identify low skill

92

industries, I calculate the proportion of all jobs in a county that are considered low skilled (Low
skill Jobs).
Black Economic Deprivation was obtained by running a principal components factor
analysis with the proportion of blacks without a high school diploma, the proportion of blacks
unemployed, the proportion of blacks households headed by a single parent, and the proportion
of all blacks living in poverty. As measures of social disorganization, I include the proportion of
the population that has moved in the past five years (Moved) and the proportion of all housing
units that are vacant (Vacant Houses). Blacks 15-29 Years Old controls for the age-crime
relationship, while Total Population controls for the size of the county, and Proportion Latino
controls for the racial composition. Region is a dummy variable indicating whether the county is
locating in the U.S. South (outside of South = 0). Finally, because high population density may
increase the opportunity for homicide, I include the proportion of housing units that are in
clusters of five or more (Housing Density).
I also include several segregation measures to test the robustness of the effect of Low
Skill Composition. Segregation, in its many forms, has been shown repeatedly to be positively
related to crime (Messner and South 1986; Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996;
Lee and Ousey 2005). However, as Massey and Denton (1988) point out, there is no one
measure of segregation. They demonstrate twenty different measures before reducing their list to
five key categories: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. For the
current analysis, I will focus on three types of segregation measures – one evenness and three
exposure.
The first measure of segregation I will employ, the index of dissimilarity, falls into
Massey and Denton‟s evenness category. The index of dissimilarity, which is based on the
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Lorenz curve, measures the proportion of the minority population that would be required to
move in order to have an even distribution. As it is used in this study, the measure will provide
the proportion of Latinos that must move from areas in which they are overrepresented to areas
in which they are underrepresented. The formula to calculate this is:
D = ∑[ (1/2) |Bi – Wi| ] * 100
where Bi is the proportion of all blacks in the county that are located in tract i, while Ni is
the proportion of all whites that are located in tract i. The measure varies between 0 and 100 and
is interpreted as the proportion of all blacks in the county that would need to move in order to
achieve perfect evenness across the city (Black-White Dissimilarity).
The second measure of segregation I will employ, social interaction, falls into Massey
and Denton‟s exposure category. It simply measures the extent to which minority members
(blacks) are exposed to majority members (Whites). This can be measured as follows:
P* = ∑
where xi, yi, and ti are the number of blacks, whites, and total population of tract i,
respectively, and X is the total number of blacks in the county. The measure varies between 0
and 1 – the former representing blacks‟ complete isolation from whites and the latter
representing full confidence that any given black will reside in a tract with a non-black (BlackWhite Interaction).
Another exposure measure that gauges segregation is social isolation. This measure,
which is very similar to social interaction, measures the degree to which blacks are exposed only
to other blacks. It is measured as follows:
P* = ∑
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where xi and ti are the number of blacks and total population of tract i, respectively, and X
is the total number of blacks in the county. The measure, like interaction, varies between 0 and 1
– the latter representing blacks‟ complete isolation from non-blacks and the former representing
full confidence that any given black will reside in a tract with a non-black (Black Isolation).
Yet another variation of the exposure category of segregation involves examining both
race and poverty – providing a measure of concentrated poverty. For instance, using the formula
given above for social isolation, black poverty concentration would be as follows: xi refers to the
number of blacks in poverty in tracti, X is the total number of blacks below the poverty line in
the entire county, and ti is the total population of tract i (Black Concentrated Poverty). This gives
the likelihood that a poor black will interact with another poor black.
Lastly, since some models in the following analysis are disaggregated by destination
(Tradition vs. New), it is important to understand how destination is defined. The following
method was developed by combining two methods used by different researchers30. Traditional
destinations are counties whose population comprised at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New
destinations are defined as counties that experienced at least a 100% increase in their Latino
population from 1990 to 200031. If a county fell into both categories, it was labeled as traditional
only32.
4.6: Results
Table 4.1 provides the descriptive findings, which confirm many of the problems faced
by black communities. For instance, one in four blacks live in poverty (.25), one in five live in a
30

The first method (State Method), used by Massey and Capoferro (2009) focuses on states. Traditional states are
those containing at least 500,000 Latinos in 1990. New destination states are those that saw a 100% increase in their
Latino population from 1990 to 2000. The second method (County Method), used by Kandel and Cromartie (2004)
focuses on counties. Traditional counties are those whose population contained at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New
destination counties are those that saw a 150% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000.
31
I use 100% to bridge the methods used by Massey and Capoferro (2009) and Kandel and Cromartie (2004). See
footnote 29.
32
Of the 3,141 counties examined, only 31 fall into both categories.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for Blacks in U.S. Counties, 2000
All Counties

Metropolitan

Non-Metropolitan

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Black Less than High School#

.28

.11

.25

.10

.36

.13

Blacks Unemployment

.06

.03

.06

.03

.06

.04

Black Single Headed
Households
Blacks Poverty

.21

.06

.21

.05

.20

.06

.25

.09

.23

.09

.30

.10

Blacks 15-29 Years Old

.25

.07

.25

.06

.26

.09

Proportion Latino

.09

.12

.09

.12

.11

.12

14.63

12.29

15.73

12.30

11.42

12.00

272,376

529,242

355,027

599,089

50,366

33,561

Housing Density

.12

.09

.14

.09

.05

.04

Vacant Houses

.10

.06

.08

.05

.15

.07

Moved

.21

.08

.22

.08

.21

.07

Proportion of Jobs Low skilled

.55

.08

.53

.07

.60

.07

Region (South=1)

.54

.50

.49

.50

.69

.47

Low-skill Composition

-.72

.50

-.65

.42

-.90

.66

Agriculture/Mining
Composition
Construction/Manufacturing
Composition
Service Composition

-1.43

1.11

-1.40

1.13

-1.51

1.07

-.56

.52

-.57

.48

-.53

.63

-.17

.54

-.27

.44

.11

.68

Other Composition

.11

.42

.09

.35

.17

.57

Black Isolation

.14

.20

.24

.21

.20

.15

Black Concentrated Poverty

.16

.09

.17

.09

.15

.09

22.53

8.67

22.34

8.45

23.05

9.25

.41

.17

.38

.17

.51

.16

Black Homicide Victimization
Rate*
Total Population

Black-White Dissimilarity
White-Black Interaction
(N=)

803

597

206

# Black economic deprivation measures (high school, unemployment, single headed households and poverty) are
listed separately for descriptive purposes, but in the multivariate analysis they are combined into a single factor. See
methods section for more detail.
*Homicide is expressed as a rate in the descriptive table, but is entered as counts in the negative binomial regression.
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single parent household (.21), and slightly more than one quarter of blacks do not have a high
school diploma (.28) – which helps explain why low-skill jobs are so important. Furthermore,
blacks have high levels of violent victimization, especially in urban areas. The black homicide
victimization rate is nearly three times the national average for blacks living in metropolitan
areas (15.73 vs. 5.50) and two times as high for those in non-metro areas (11.42 vs. 5.50). These
rates are high even compared to Latinos who have similar levels of disadvantage – their
victimization rate is only 6.50 (not reported).
Table 4.1 also demonstrates Latinos‟ dominance of low-skill jobs. For all counties, the
Low-skill Composition measure is -.72, which converted into an odds ([1/e^-.72]=2.05) tells us
Latinos are twice as likely as blacks to be working in a low-skill job. This holds true for both
metro (-.65) and non-metro (-.90) counties. Furthermore, clear differences can be found when
examining the different types of industries. Latinos tend to dominate Agriculture/Mining (-1.43)
where they are four times more likely to find employment than blacks, and to a lesser extent,
Construction/Manufacturing (-.56). Blacks, however, fare much better in the “Other” category
(which includes Transportation, Waste Management, and Retail [.11]) where they are more
likely than Latinos to find employment in both urban and rural counties. Finally, dominance of
the Service industry depends on the area. Blacks do better in non-metropolitan counties (.11),
while Latinos fare better in metro areas (-.27). All of these findings demonstrate the importance
of examining, not only low-skill jobs as a whole, but also individual industries.
Table 4.2 reports findings from the negative binomial regression predicting black
homicide victimization. Model 1 shows that, when examining all counties together, low-skill
composition
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Table 4.2: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Black Homicide
Victimization in U.S. Counties, 2000
All Counties
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Blacks 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Black Economic Deprivation
Proportion Latino
Region (South=1)
Low-skill Composition
N

Metropolitan Counties
Model 2

0.13***
(0.05)
-0.17
(0.40)
-0.41
(0.65)
1.65***
(0.43)
-3.37***
(0.94)
0.10
(0.47)
0.52***
(0.08)
-1.17
(0.25)
-0.05
(0.09)
-0.10
(0.07)
803

0.13***
(0.05)
-0.14
(0.45)
0.48
(0.77)
1.24***
(0.44)
-3.37***
(1.01)
-0.21
(0.50)
0.61***
(0.08)
1.05***
(0.25)
-0.05
(0.08)
-0.15**
(0.08)
597

Rural Counties
Model 3
0.60
(2.14)
1.00
(1.00)
-1.20
(1.17)
0.44
(1.55)
-1.33
(1.26)
2.32***
(0.78)
0.27**
(0.13)
-1.28
(1.59)
0.33
(0.23)
-0.14
(0.08)
206

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0. Black
Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10

has no effect on black homicide. Model 2, however, examines only metropolitan counties and
finds a significant effect (-0.15). The negative sign on the coefficient means that when the lowskill markets shift toward blacks, their homicide victimization goes down. This also means that
as Latinos gain a greater foothold in low-skill jobs, black homicide will increase. Lastly, Model 3
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examines non-metropolitan counties and finds no effect for low-skill composition – which is
consistent with previous research (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010d).
Table 4.3 continues the analysis by focusing only on metropolitan counties. However,
metro counties are now separated into new destinations and traditional destinations. As noted
previously, Latinos are being recruited by many employers in new destinations, so one could
expect their low-skill market presence quite strong. Model 1 simply replicates the Metropolitan
model from the previous table (Model 2 in Table 4.2), which finds that low-skill composition has
a significant effect on black homicide. Model 2 focuses on metropolitan New Destination
counties and finds, as expected, that when Latinos dominate the low-skill labor market, black
victimization increases. To evaluate the strength of the relationship, the coefficients are
converted to a proportion33. This calculation shows that a one standard deviation increase in the
black presence in low-skill markets is associated with a 16.5% decline in black homicide
victimization. Model 3 limits the sample to metropolitan traditional destinations and finds no
effect for low-skill composition34. This may be due to the fact that Latinos and blacks are not
directly competing for the same jobs in these areas. See the Discussion and Conclusion section
for a detailed explanation.
Table 4.4 test the robustness of the effect of low-skill composition in metropolitan New
Destination counties by controlling for several different segregation measures. As discussed
previously, segregation is often one of the explanations for why many blacks are unable to find
gainful employment, especially in urban areas. These four models test whether blacks‟ inability
to dominate the low-skill market is due to greater levels of segregation. Model 1 controls for

33

This is done by using the formula (eb*s-1)*100, where b is the coefficient and s is the standard deviation of the
variable in question. In this case, Low-skill Composition.
34
A model was also run for all traditional counties, including both metro and non-metro counties. The results were
not substantively different.
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Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Black Homicide
Victimization in Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2000
All Metropolitan
Counties
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Blacks 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Black Economic Deprivation
Proportion Latino
Region (South=1)
Low-skill Composition
N

0.13***
(0.05)
-0.14
(0.45)
0.48
(0.77)
1.24***
(0.44)
-3.37***
(1.01)
-0.21
(0.50)
0.61***
(0.08)
1.05***
(0.25)
-0.05
(0.08)
-0.15**
(0.08)
597

New Destination
Counties
Model 2
-0.09
(0.19)
-0.77
(0.70)
0.45
(0.76)
2.51***
(0.52)
-4.93***
(1.07)
-0.72
(0.48)
0.76***
(0.08)
-1.10
(1.59)
-0.11
(0.10)
-0.32***
(0.09)
267

Traditional
Counties
Model 3
0.14***
(0.03)
0.35
(1.10)
-0.78
(0.66)
-0.94
(0.73)
-3.88
(3.32)
-4.31†
(2.44)
0.59***
(0.14)
-0.68***
(0.25)
-0.25***
(0.10)
0.42
(0.25)
83

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0. Black
Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10
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Table 4.4: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Black Homicide
Victimization in 267 New Destination, Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2000
Black
Homicide
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Blacks 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Black Economic Deprivation
Proportion Latino
Region (South=1)
Low-skill Composition
Black Isolation
Black Concentrated Poverty

Black
Homicide
Model 2

-0.13
(0.17)
-0.35
(0.79)
0.04
(0.70)
2.34***
(0.57)
-4.31***
(1.00)
-0.37
(0.52)
0.60***
(0.08)
-0.27
(1.44)
-0.23
(0.13)
-0.20**
(0.09)
0.74***
(0.27)
-----

Black
Homicide
Model 3

Black
Homicide
Model 4

-0.17
(0.18)
-0.34
(0.76)
-0.02
(0.73)
2.31***
(0.56)
-4.21***
(1.05)
-0.19
(0.51)
0.50***
(0.10)
-0.23
(1.53)
-0.24
(0.13)
-0.21**
(0.10)
-----

-0.19
(0.18)
-1.22
(0.79)
0.09
(0.83)
3.04***
(0.55)
-4.69***
(1.10)
-0.69
(0.50)
0.66***
(0.09)
-0.24
(1.68)
-0.10
(0.12)
-0.21**
(0.10)
-----

-0.14
(0.18)
-0.73
(0.82)
0.09
(0.85)
2.68***
(0.58)
-4.93***
(1.10)
-0.62
(0.47)
0.68***
(0.09)
-0.64
(1.67)
-0.05
(0.11)
-0.23**
(0.10)
-----

-----

-----

0.01
(0.01)
-----

-----

Black-White Dissimilarity

-----

2.09***
(0.59)
-----

Black-White Interaction

-----

-----

-0.37†
(0.21)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0. Black
Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10
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blacks living in isolation – one of the theories of black disadvantage put forth by Wilson (1987).
While Model 1 finds that isolation does in fact increase black victimization (.74), it does not
account for the effect of low-skill composition, which is still significant (-0.20). Results for
Model 2 are very similar – instead of controlling for blacks interacting with only other blacks
(black isolation), I control for poor blacks interacting with other poor blacks (concentrated
poverty) – with the same result. Concentrated poverty does increase black homicide (2.09), but
low-skill composition remains significant (-.21).
Models 3 and 4 focus on blacks‟ segregation from whites, through Black-White
Dissimilarity and Interaction, respectively. Black-White Dissimilarity is not significant in Model
3, while Black-White Interaction does help lower black homicide victimization in Model 4.
However, in both models low-skill composition maintains its significance and direction. These
four models show that while segregation is an important predictor of black victimization, it
cannot explain why Latinos dominate low-skill labor markets.
Table 4.5 keeps the focus on metropolitan New Destination counties, but it focuses on the
effect of industry specific low-skill composition measures. Model 1, for instance, controls for
the ethnic composition of low-skill jobs in Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining. Findings
show that this sector does not affect black homicide, likely do to Latinos historical dominance in
these occupations. Latinos have been recruited for agricultural work in the United States or
nearly 100 years (Craig 1971). Therefore it is likely that blacks do not directly compete with
Latinos for these jobs.
Model 2 examines the ethnic composition of the Manufacturing and Construction sectors.
Results show that when blacks gain a greater foothold in these jobs, their homicide rates decline
(-.23). This is likely due to the fact that these are some of the better paying low-skill jobs, thus
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Table 4.5: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Black Homicide
Victimization in 267 New Destination, Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2000
Black
Homicide
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Blacks 15-29 Years Old
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled
Black Economic Deprivation
Proportion Latino
Region (South=1)
Agriculture Composition
Manufacturing/Construction
Composition
Service Composition
Other Composition

Black
Homicide
Model 2

-0.19
(0.02)
-1.29
(0.85)
0.31
(0.79)
2.86***
(0.67)
-4.28***
(1.13)
-0.12
(0.58)
0.56***
(0.11)
-1.54
(1.41)
-0.13
(0.12)
0.05
(0.05)
-----

-.11
(0.19)
-0.82
(0.67)
-0.27
(0.81)
2.46***
(0.54)
-5.18***
(1.07)
-0.24
(0.51)
0.75***
(0.08)
-1.04
(1.55)
-0.11
(0.11)
-----0.23**
(0.11)
-----

---------

-----

Black
Homicide
Model 3
-0.11
(0.21)
-1.21†
(0.66)
0.29
(0.80)
2.82***
(0.58)
-4.98***
(1.09)
-0.33
(0.51)
0.67***
(0.10)
-0.27
(1.55)
-0.06
(0.11)
-----

Black
Homicide
Model 4
-0.17
(0.21)
-1.36**
(0.65)
0.58
(0.78)
2.77***
(0.55)
-4.79***
(1.12)
-0.05
(0.52)
0.71***
(0.1)
-0.22
(1.48)
0.01
(0.10)
-----

-----

-----

0.13
(0.12)
-----

-----0.22†
(0.12)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the cluster option in Stata 9.0. Black
Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.
***p≤.01 **p≤ .05 †p≤.10
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providing not only stability in the form of steady employment, but also non-poverty level
income. Model 3 examines Service sector jobs, which have no effect on black homicide (.13).
This is likely due to the dominance of women in these jobs. Since women are much less prone to
violence, the overall black victimization rate is not greatly affected. Finally, Model 4 examines
the composition of “Other” low-skill sectors, which includes Transportation, Waste
Management, and Retail jobs. Although Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a) suggest that “Other”
sector jobs do not benefit blacks, and perhaps even increases their homicide rates, I find that
when blacks gain greater employment in these industries, their victimization decreases. This is
an interesting contradiction that should be examined more closely in future research.
4.7: Discussion and Conclusion
Past research has shown that a lack of low-skill jobs not only increases unemployment for
blacks, it also increases their homicide rates. Therefore, it is important for scholars to understand
the potentially negative effects brought about by increased competition for these jobs. Given the
dramatic increase in the U.S. Latino population over the past two decades – and this population‟s
reliance on low-skill employment – this paper attempts to determine how increased Latino
competition for low-skill jobs affects black homicide victimization. I observe several important
findings; (1) Latino competition for jobs appears to only affect urban blacks. (2) This effect can
be further narrowed to urban areas that have recently experienced a large increase its Latino
population. (3) Segregation cannot account for the effect of Latino labor competition. (4) Black
homicide increases the most when they lose ground in Manufacturing, Construction,
Transportation, Waste Management, and Service jobs. I draw several implications from these
findings.
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First, the results of this paper show that the effects of immigration policy resonate beyond
the immigrants themselves and impact segments of the native population as well. The findings
show that changes in immigration policy, which fueled a dramatic increase in the U.S. Latino
population, have worked indirectly to increase black homicide victimization rates.
Second, the findings presented here confirm the research conducted by Shihadeh and
Barranco (2010a), in that Latino competition for low-skill employment increases black violence
in urban areas. However, this paper goes further by comparing the job-displacement effect in
traditional and new destinations. As hypothesized, the Latino low-skill effect is limited to new
destinations. Perhaps this is because Latino migrants are aggressively recruited by employers in
low-skill industries, who extend their reach as far as Mexico to find new employees – putting
blacks at a disadvantage for these job openings. The story in traditional destinations, however, is
likely very different. By definition, these areas have relatively large Latino populations, and
house some of the largest ethnic enclaves in the country. As Portes and Jensen (1992) point out,
ethnic enclaves “offer employment comparable to those of the mainstream economy… [and] this
network creates new entrepreneurial opportunities for newcomers – opportunities that are absent
elsewhere” (pg. 420). In other words, Latinos in these areas are likely to find employment
within the enclave and therefore are much less likely to compete for the same jobs as blacks. As
a result, Latino “competition” for jobs in Traditional areas has no effect on black violence.
Third, Latino competition for low-skill jobs appears to only affect blacks when the jobs
are in certain industries. Manufacturing and Construction, two of the better paying low-skill
industries, are one such example. It is likely that these jobs provide not only stability in the form
of steady employment, but also a non-poverty level income. In other words, blacks employed in
these industries are much less likely to be among the “working poor”. Other industries where
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Latino competition makes an impact on black violence are Transportation, Waste Management,
and Retail. It appears that these industries have in the past been fairly reliable sources of
employment for blacks. Losing ground in black-niches such as these is bound to ripple into an
increase in black crime. In sum, this analysis shows the importance of taking an in-depth look at
low-skill employment, particularly with respect to inter-industry differences.
Finally, there are some limitations to this analysis. The biggest limitation is the inability
to measure one-to-one job displacement. While the data allow a comparison of the “odds” of
blacks and Latinos being in certain jobs, it does not show whether blacks are actually losing jobs
to Latinos. Even if they are losing jobs to blacks, one cannot determine with these data if an
employment-displaced individual later found work elsewhere. Future research should examine
how can blacks use their social networks more effectively to find employment. Since blacks rely
more on formal job placement agencies, how can we improve their effectiveness? How can we
expand the market of low-skill jobs? Finally, are there other industries, besides those analyzed in
this study, in which blacks fare well? Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a) suggest jobs in education,
health, and social services may provide an alternative to low-skill employment. With many
black communities already facing a myriad of social problems, it is imperative that researchers
learn as much as possible about yet another potential structural impediment: low-skill job
competition and the influx of Latino workers.

106

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The results of the three analyses, taken together, provide useful insight into how
immigration policy and changes in the Latino population can affect homicide rates in the United
States. It also opens avenues for future research.
First, all three analyses demonstrate the importance of recognizing that the effect of
immigration is not constant, but actually varies across communities. As the first two papers
show, there are significant differences in the effect of immigration between traditional and new
destinations. Essentially, new destinations seem less prepared to handle an increasing number of
immigrants. The third paper shows that Latinos in new destinations compete with blacks for the
same low-skill jobs, while the presence of ethnic enclaves in traditional areas seems to dampen
the intensity of this competition.
The second analysis demonstrates the importance of Latino-Latino contact. This
provides some insight into the differences between traditional and new destinations. Since
Latino-Latino contact is much more common in traditional areas, they appear much better
situated to handle a large influx of migrants. However, unlike the effect of immigration, LatinoLatino contact has the same effect in both new and traditional areas – it significantly lowers
Latino homicide victimization.
Although this contact undoubtedly explains some of the difference found between
traditional and new destinations, it cannot fully explain why recent immigration increases
homicide in new destinations. As discussed in the first two sections, changing Mexican
emigration patterns may also play an important role. Since 1990, Mexican immigrants have
increasingly come from violent states. Furthermore, the migrants from these violent states are
more likely to settle in new destinations than their predecessors.
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One can posit that, once the emigration patterns in Mexico shifted more to Violent States,
new destinations were not able to handle these newcomers given their lack of established Latino
communities, thus leading to higher homicide victimization. This is not to say, however, that
these recent migrants are more violent than their predecessors and are committing more crimes.
Given the violence in their home states, these immigrants are exposed to more violence than
those who came before them. It is possible that they are more accepting of violence or perhaps
less sensitive to it. If this is the case, they will be much less likely to intervene when they see
something bad happening in their new community.
Finally, the third paper shows that immigrants are not the only ones affected by changes
in immigration policy. Indeed, changes in immigration policy, which has resulted in a dramatic
increase in the U.S. Latino population, have worked indirectly to increase black homicide
victimization rates. This rise in the Latino population has led to an increase in competition for a
limited number of low-skill jobs, which has worked to increase black homicide victimization.
However, like immigration, the effect is only significant in new destinations. Furthermore, the
competition has the greatest impact when the jobs are in Manufacturing, Construction,
Transportation, Waste Management, and Retail.
Given the stark differences between new and traditional destinations found throughout
this study, the main goal of future researchers should be to determine how long it takes a
community of become a “traditional destination”. After 10-15 years of Latinos settling in new
destinations, how long will it take for these new destinations to become, in effect, old and
established communities? Perhaps the necessary networks will form over time or, more
ominously, the currently high rates in new destinations are a prelude to a descent into an
underclass existence. Though these questions cannot yet be answered, new data from the 2010
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U.S. Census and multi-year estimates released by the American Community Survey will soon
give researchers their first opportunity to examine these questions. With the growth of the U.S.
Latino population showing no signs of slowing, there is little doubt that these, and other
questions, about Latinos and immigration will occupy the focus of countless researchers for
decades to come.
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